Workers\u27 health in Connecticut : an historical analysis of the Uretek outbreak by Cowan, David B.
Yale University
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Yale Medicine Thesis Digital Library School of Medicine
1988
Workers' health in Connecticut : an historical
analysis of the Uretek outbreak
David B. Cowan
Yale University
Follow this and additional works at: http://elischolar.library.yale.edu/ymtdl
This Open Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Medicine at EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly
Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale Medicine Thesis Digital Library by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital
Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation






Permission for photocopying or microfilming of 11 j.'J&nl/'&v 
(Title of thesIs) 
for the purpose of individual scholarly consultation or refer¬ 
ence Is hereby granted by the author. This permission is not 
to be Interpreted as affecting publication of this work or 
otherwise placing it In the public domain, and the author re¬ 
serves all rights of ownership guaranteed under common law 
protection of unpublished manuscripts. 






Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2017 with funding from 
The National Endowment for the Humanities and the Arcadia Fund 
https://archive.org/details/workershealthincOOcowa 

WORKERS' HEALTH IN CONNECTICUT: 
AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE URETEK OUTBREAK 
A Thesis Submitted to the Yale University 
School of Medicine in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Medicine 
by 




Workers Health in Connecticut: 
An Historical Analysis of the Uretek Outbreak 
David B Cowan 
1988 
In the fall of 1986, the largest reported contemporary 
outbreak of occupationally induced liver injury in the 
United States was reported at a New Haven factory called 
Uretek. The plant produced polyurethane coated textiles 
used in rafts and inflatable aircraft slides with common 
chemicals employed in thousands of other plants worldwide. 
A clinical and epidemiological study of the plant revealed 
that 36 of 58 (62%) workers tested had elevations of either 
aspartate aminotransferase (AST or SGOT) or alanine 
aminotransferase (ALT or SGPT). Only 1 of 12 nonproduction 
workers showed any elevations (p < .01). Common infectious 
causes of hepatitis were excluded serologically in all but 
two workers, and toxic liver injury was confirmed histologi¬ 
cally in five biopsied workers. The occurrence contradicted 
the prevailing medical opinion that toxic hepatitis was an 
entity of the past. The workplace survey identified 
Dimethylformamide (DMF), a widely used solvent and known 
hepatotoxin, as the most likely cause of disease. Case 
Reports published since the Uretek outbreak suggest that DMF 
may be a health concern for other workers and the public. 
The outbreak was greeted with horror and astonishment 
by the press and government officials. However, the 
investigation that followed revealed that state and federal 
government bureaucracies had known about some hazards at 
Uretek for almost a decade. More important, the original 
furor over who was to blame for conditions at Uretek 
obscured a startling fact: no contemporary institution had 
the authority and expertise to evaluate and correct 
workplace health hazards like those uncovered at Uretek. 
Contrary to popular belief, the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) has never been able to 
accomplish this task. The focus of the news reports also 
ignored important history: that the Connecticut Department 
of Health had performed just such a role as a workplace 
health watchdog in the 1920's until the 1950's. 
The assumption that the outbreak represented an unad¬ 
dressed gap in a seamless program was inaccurate and short¬ 
sighted. Uretek exposed the flaws of the current system in 
a uniquely lucid fashion. This paper attempts to glean from 
the Uretek example, and from the history of occupational 
health in the state, better means of protecting workers from 
occupational disease in the future. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of 1986, the largest reported contemporary 
outbreak of occupationally induced liver disease in the 
United States was discovered at a New Haven factory. The 
plant produced polyurethane coated textiles used in life 
rafts and inflatable aircraft escape slides, among other 
things. The coating mixture included chemicals employed in 
thousands of other plants worldwide. It was a gripping 
story of successful factory owners, irresponsible at best, 
and of workers, physically and economically vulnerable, and 
the press lost little time trumpeting the drama. From the 
point of view of journalists, the outbreak of liver disease, 
coupled with a major building collapse in Bridgeport, placed 
occupational health on the front page. From the point of 
view of the academic physicians and professionals involved, 
it was a textbook case of disease identification and 
prevention which resulted in a successful medical interven¬ 
tion, full recovery of most affected individuals, and a 
credible surveillance program to guard against recurrence. 
Finally, for government regulators, a potentially hazardous 
chemical was identified along with laws that didn't help, 
surveillance that didn't work, and enforcement that was 
timorous. No one doubted that the Occupational Safety and 




over the unregulated past which had preceded it. There 
seemed to be general agreement that whatever problems 
existed were reflections of underfunding and understaffing. 
However, there was also a story that was not told and 
assumptions that were not questioned. Absent in the din of 
press accounts was an awareness of the vigorous occupational 
health surveillance system that existed in Connecticut in 
the 1940's and '50's. In the rush to assign culpability, 
and avoid responsibility, there was no awareness of the fact 
that the outbreak probably couldn't have happened 40 years 
ago. The hubris of the "progress mentality" caused many to 
miss what the workers understood: there was something 
terribly wrong with the system far beyond the funding of 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration. This thesis 
is an attempt to discover what lessons the outbreak, and the 
history of workplace surveillance, hold for occupational 
medicine. The next chapter presents the findings of a 
clinical-epidemiological survey of the Uretek workers, the 
first contemporary cross-sectional epidemiologic study to 
link hepatitis to an organic solvent.1 Chapter three 
consists of a discussion of the chemicals used at Uretek, 
especially DMF and its known hazards. Chapter four includes 
a brief discussion of the strike and the response of 
government to the crisis, while the history of occupational 
health in Connecticut is the topic of the fifth chapter. 
. 
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The sixth and final chapter will present recommendations for 
the future. 
The Outbreak 
Medically, the hepatitis outbreak was of interest 
because of the high attack rate—36 of 58 (62%) workers 
tested; because of the severity and chronicity of several of 
the cases; and simply because it occurred at all. The 
rarity of acute liver disease as a consequence of workplace 
exposure is widely accepted. The foremost authority on 
hepatotoxicity, US pathologist Hyman Zimmerman, concluded in 
1978 that "occupational exposure has, in the past, led to 
subacute and acute chemical, hepatic injury. [However], 
this overt form of occupational hepatic disease has largely 
disappeared [italics mine]."2 Thus, the discovery of the 
outbreak was not only a contradiction of the prevailing 
diagnostic opinion, but an opportunity to explore the 
detection, treatment, and natural history of a supposedly 
rare disease. An epidemiologic study was undertaken by the 
staff of the occupational medicine program of Yale medical 
school and Yale-New Haven Hospital.3 The occupational 
nature of the outbreak was confirmed by ruling out other 
causes of hepatitis in the workforce and Dimethyl Formamide 
(DMF) was identified as the most likely cause, by reviewing 




(HCON (CH3)2) is an excellent and versatile solvent widely 
used in the production of synthetic fibers, polyurethane, 
pharmaceuticals, herbicides, and numerous other compounds. 
Appropriate changes were made, under the direction of the 
occupational medicine program, to ensure that the workers 
safety was protected and that a medical monitoring system 
was established. 
Social & Political Consequences 
The Uretek outbreak, named for the factory where it 
occurred, is worthy of careful analysis for more than the 
unique medical information it imparts. It was a medical 
event with social consequences, reflected in the fact that 
the outbreak was the nidus for a great deal of activity 
apart from the epidemiological study. Uretek was a social, 
political, and economic drama as well. The workers were poor 
immigrants from Puerto Rico, El Salvador, and Chile. Some 
were here illegally, and possessed a paradoxical fear that 
recognition of the outbreak might lead to their deportation. 
The workers became the focus of a bitter unionization drive 
during the investigation of the outbreak, a drive based 
primarily on health and safety concerns. Meanwhile, the 
workers, who in the best of times were compensated near the 
minimum wage, experienced a type of wage intimidation all 
too common in the workplace: company attorneys tied the 
. 
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workers' compensation cases up in court. The owners had 
other legal troubles having been the first company convicted 
of violating Connecticut's new Hazardous Waste Disposal Act. 
The grounds of Uretek, where neighborhood children oc¬ 
casionally played, were strewn with hundreds of unmarked 
and leaking barrels filled with waste solvents. The factory 
had been pumping hundreds of tons of solvent fumes into the 
air of a residential neighborhood for years, and with the 
new revelations about the factory, neighbors were angry. 
Everyone from doctors to neighbors, from workers to local 
politicians called for "the government" to do something, 
though this "something" was vitiated by competing interests. 
Shutdown was, for example, the neighbors choice, whereas the 
workers wanted jobs with diminished risk. This story, with 
the allure of life-threatening disease, competing interests, 
desperate immigrants, and bureaucratic inertia took the top 
spot on local television for days, and was front page 
newspaper material for weeks. Eventually it reached the 
national media, print and electronic. 
The federal Occupational Safety and Health Administra¬ 
tion (OSHA), department of health, department of labor, and 
state environmental protection agency became involved. All 
of these agencies expressed shock and indignation at the 
first reports, but in the ensuing discussions, the hepatitis 
outbreak somehow fell outside of each one's purview. The 
workers were understandably puzzled, the attorney general 
. 
Introduction 11 
was frustrated in his attempts to determine who had 
authority over the health of the workers, and everyone else 
was busy pointing fingers. "How could Uretek happen in 
1987?" asked the attorney general of Connecticut. 
With surprising clarity, the outbreak revealed a number 
of important facts about the condition of occupational 
health in Connecticut, and by implication, the U.S. It 
pointed to a profound misunderstanding of health and safety 
laws: misunderstanding by the public, and elected 
officials, of the capabilities of the agencies and miscon¬ 
ception by the agencies of their own responsibilities. The 
duration of poor conditions at Uretek, at least a decade, 
suggested that there might be large numbers of similar 
"outbreaks" unrecognized and unreported nationwide. In 
fact, the poor conditions at Uretek persisted for so long 
that one wonders if they would ever have been corrected had 
it not been for a series of happenstances. The fact that as 
many as 32 of 36 workers with liver abnormalities were 
asymptomatic, far from confirming the rarity of occupational 
liver toxicity, pointed to the possibility of many un¬ 
detected cases. The Attorney General's question seemed 
worthy of further study. 
The press concluded that Reagan era budget cuts had 
allowed Uretek to exist and persist. OSHA had after all 
inspected the plant in 1979, but not since. But on deeper 
analysis Uretek heightens concerns, voiced for years, about 
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the adequacy of the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) act 
and the state laws which regulate the workplace. The 
failure of the "system" in the Uretek case elucidates that 
what has become widely accepted as the answer to workplace 
injuries and illnesses (by management and some unions), the 
OSH act of 1970, is really ill-equipped to deal with disease 
even in the best of circumstances. The flaw, in a word, is 
that neither physicians nor other health professionals are 
involved in workplace evaluation. 
A look at the uncharted history of occupational health 
in Connecticut reveals that workers in 1947 may have been 
better protected than workers in 1987. For example, 
physicians played a central and active role in workplace 
health protection through the state Bureau of Industrial 
Hygiene. Sadly current proposals for improving the health 
of workers, such as the establishment of a reliable 
reporting system, or a system of medical monitoring, were 
debated in the Connecticut legislature in 1927. Even the 
arguments advanced in the debate have changed little. 
Blaming the victim is as popular in 1987 as it was in 1927, 
though owners and legislators are less likely to state this 
view openly. In 1927, a congressman asserted that "98% of 
the accidents are due to the carelessness of the operator."4 
Sixty years later, Uretek attorneys maintained the position 
that worker illness was due to carelessness, self-abuse, and 
"moral turpitude". The poverty of this view is also 
. 
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unchanged with time and will be evident after a review of 
the outbreak. Chapter five as already mentioned, examines 
the history of occupational health legislation in Connec¬ 
ticut, and in the nation to the extent necessary to make 
sense of events in the state. 
There is at present a restricted but vigorous debate 
occurring about the means to improve workplace health and 
safety. Chapter six. Prognoses and Prescriptions, is a 
contribution to this dialogue. It reexamines the lessons of 
the outbreak with an eye to detecting and preventing 





1. D0ssing (1986), 132. 
2. Zimmerman (1978), 315. See also Mitchell, J.W. et 
al. (1987), 266 which appears in chapter 2. 
3. Due to difficulty obtaining the cooperation of 
the factory owners, the study began after the 
institution of environmental controls made on the 
program's recommendation. 
4. Public Health and Safety Committee Hearing (1927). 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE OUTBREAK 
The Uretek outbreak, its size and severity, raises 
serious questions about the veracity of conclusions reached 
by Dr Zimmerman, and others, concerning the rarity of 
occupational liver disease. A statement issued by the 
American Occupational Medicine Association's Committee on 
occupational medical practice, "representing the composite 
best judgement of its members", demonstrates just how widely 
this view of hepatotoxins is held. 
Many of the solvents used in the early days of the 
chemical industry were hepatorenal toxins of some 
note, eg Carbon Tetrachloride. However, as this 
problem was recognized, solvents intended for 
routine use were selected so that hepatotoxicity 
is not a prominent feature.1 
Although this thesis argues that the prevailing opinion is 
ill-founded, it is important to keep it in mind when 
assessing the skill and acumen of the medical professionals 
presented with the outbreak. Investigators had to overcome 
their intimate acquaintance with an authoritative view which 
denied the disease they were observing. 
An index case is in some ways as revelatory about 
medical reasoning as it is about pathology. As the first 
patient's story is quite informative, particularly in regard 
to how such outbreaks can be discovered-or missed- it is 
presented in some detail. The rest of the cases will be 
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presented in aggregate and the medical and epidemiological 
findings summarized. 
Roberto Betancourt2, a robust 40 year old Puerto Rican, 
arrived in New Haven just four months before his hospital 
visit. He spoke little English and had left his immediate 
family behind. He had come to New Haven with hopes of a 
better life, and his brother-in-law, a worker at a local 
factory, had found him a job with his employer two weeks 
before his trip to the hospital. On the last Sunday in 
September of 1986 Mr. Betancourt had his niece take him to 
the Yale-New Haven hospital emergency room because of 
abdominal pain, headache and nausea that had begun a few 
days before. He was seen by Heidi Miller, a Physician's 
assistant, and Dr. Steven Sigal, a resident in medicine. 
Actually it was not Mr. Betancourt's first visit with these 
symptoms; he had been sent home from the ER two days before 
with the diagnosis of flu, and a day later, gastritis. Nor 
was he the first Hispanic man to present with a similar 
story, nor even the first Uretek worker referred to the 
occupational medicine clinic, as Mr Betancourt eventually 
was.3 However, these facts were not appreciated until many 
weeks later. The medical history was non-specific; 
headache, nausea, and variable midepigastric abdominal pain 
which was not exacerbated or alleviated by food, though his 
symptoms worsened after one beer. Mr. Betancourt denied 
previous illnesses and alcohol or drug abuse, stating that 
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he drank five to ten beers per week. As in the case of most 
workers, there was no special sign or symptom indicating 
vocational etiology. In fact, it might never have come to 
light if not for the fact that both providers in the ER had 
an interest in and knowledge about work-related disease. 
Prompted by their unusual interest, the examiners questioned 
him closely about his work. The job his brother had 
obtained for him two weeks before was in a "glue" factory on 
Lenox St in New Haven, the name of which he did not know. 
He worked with chemicals which smelled bad but there had not 
been any accidents to his knowledge. He had heard rumors of 
other workers who had been ill but could not provide 
details. This line of questioning was not pursued any 
further at the time as the two providers had already 
obtained a good occupational history for a case that did not 
seem likely to be work-related. After just two weeks at 
work, it seemed far more likely that this was something he 
had brought with him from home: viral, or perhaps alcoholic 
hepatitis, the latter as a consequence of excessive 
drinking, despite his denial of abuse. Finally, a gastric 
ulcer, cholecystitis, and cholelithiasis (the latter two 
diseases representing disease of the gall bladder), rounded 
out the likely possibilities. The physical exam was 
unremarkable, including heme negative stool, and clinicians 
felt that the diagnosis of an ulcer was unlikely. 
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A battery of appropriate tests was ordered, including a 
CBC with differential cell counts, electrolytes, liver 
function tests, hepatitis A (IgM) antibody, hepatitis B 
surface antibody and antigen, and stool for ova and 
parasites. Concluding that Mr. Betancourt's workplace 
sounded worrisome even if it was not the cause of his 
symptoms, Ms Miller arranged for him to be seen the 
following Friday at the Occupational Medicine Clinic. 
The occupational clinic is located in the old hospital 
building adjacent to the new medical center. It was founded 
in 1979 by Dr Mark Cullen, a graduate of both the Yale 
medical school and the internal medicine residency program, 
with the goal of filling a need for workplace health and 
safety services in the heavily industrialized region around 
the medical center, as well as to provide training to future 
occupational health specialists. Dr. Cullen perceived that 
the passage of the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OSHA) 
of 1970, far from resolving the issues of workplace health, 
had only increased the need for physicians knowledgeable 
about the treatment and prevention of occupational diseases, 
particularly since all but the largest area employers did 
not have their own health experts4. The clinic operates 
quite independently of the rest of the medical center as Dr. 
Cullen's success at funding the clinic with outside grants 
has brought with it a good deal of autonomy. Until the 
Uretek outbreak, in fact, many people within the medical 
. 
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center were unaware of its existence. That is not to say 
that the clinic was not busy. It has always enjoyed a good 
reputation among area unions, health and safety groups, and 
the few area physicians aware of it, and as a result, there 
have always been more patients than staff to see them. At 
the time of Mr. Betancourt's visit to the emergency room in 
the fall of 1986 there was a three to four week wait for 
appointments despite the fact that the clinical staff had 
doubled in the previous two years to include three physi¬ 
cians, three fellows5, an industrial hygienist, a part-time 
social worker and consulting psychiatrist, an epidemio¬ 
logist, and a part-time data coordinator, in addition to 
social work and medical students on rotation. 
My first day in clinic as a medical student happened to 
be the day of Mr Betancourt's appointment, October 3, 1986. 
Dr Cullen and Dr Redlich, a first year fellow , had already 
heard of the patient from Heidi Miller. There was skep¬ 
ticism that his symptoms could be work-related given the 
rarity of toxic hepatitis and the short period of exposure. 
Nonetheless, the story was intriguing...and quickly became 
more so. By the time Mr Betancourt was seen in clinic he 
was feeling somewhat better. Ms Miller had instructed him 
to stay away from work which had turned out to be no 
problem: his employer had fired him when he called in sick. 
A number of laboratory results had come back: the day of his 
third ER visit (9/28) the Aspartate Aminotransferase (AST or 
' 
Outbreak 20 
SGOT) had been 949 U/L (nl 15-35) while other tests 
including Alkaline Phosphatase, Bilirubin, and Lipase were 
all normal. Hepatitis A IgM antibody was negative as was 
Hepatitis B Surface Antigen. Hepatitis A IgG was positive 
indicating a distant history of Hepatitis A infection but 
this was unsurprising in a Puerto Rican native and did not 
account for the current signs or symptoms. Repeat Liver 
Function Tests (LFT's), drawn the day prior to the occupa¬ 
tional clinic visit, showed the AST greatly improved at 31, 
but the Alanine Aminotransferase (ALT or SGPT), assayed for 
the first time, at 317 U/L (nl 6-37). The patient was again 
asked about alcohol and drug consumption and he adamantly 
maintained his earlier report of no more than 10 beers per 
week. It was decided that an ultrasonographic examination 
of the gall bladder was indicated; a few days later it was 
reported as normal. The patients symptoms and transaminases 
were improving slowly and he promised to bring in the name 
of the factory on a follow-up visit (he had no phone) in a 
few days. After screens for Cytomegalovirus and Epstein- 
Barr virus were negative, the presumptive diagnosis of toxic 
hepatitis was reached, by exclusion, with the thought that 
perhaps the patient was peculiarly sensitive to the 
chemicals in the plant. Everyone wanted to find out more 
about the employer, but there was no outward harbinger that 
this was an index case. 
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In another stroke of good fortune, Heidi Miller again 
happened to be in the ER a few days later when another 
Hispanic gentleman arrived with the same symptoms, and 
importantly the same place of employment on Lenox St. The 
company was called Uretek, and there he and 40 others coated 
fabric with "glue" for parachutes and life rafts he said. 
The second patient was also evaluated in the Occupational 
medicine clinic with the same results: elevated LFT's and 
abdominal pain, no alcohol abuse, no infectious diseases, 
and no job, as he too had been fired when he reported he was 
ill. The clinic social worker was called in to help both 
workers apply for worker's compensation. Although it 
appeared that they had been fired illegally, legal activity 
was postponed? no one was eager to go back to Uretek. 
Dr. William Beckett, a faculty member in the clinic, 
took on the chore of contacting the employer. This can be a 
frustrating endeavor as the Yale clinic operates without 
any legal authority and can only enter workplaces with 
permission. Although a physician or anyone else is free to 
contact the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Ad¬ 
ministration (OSHA), the clinic had been frustrated by the 
results of recent attempts. Since Reagan had taken office, 
OSHA had taken to inspecting only on the complaint of a 
worker. Betancourt and his colleague had been conveniently 
terminated. While logic would dictate that an inspection 
might be prudent, recent experience raised doubts about the 
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prospect of a vigorous inspection. OSHA had been known in 
recent years to call an employer in lieu of inspecting if 
the complaint had not come from a worker. A few months 
before, OSHA had declined to inspect a dry cleaning business 
from which clinic staff had examined several overexposed 
workers (and which refused to cooperate with the clinic) on 
grounds the complaint was "too vague". The clinic in¬ 
dustrial hygienist customarily received long questionnaires 
in response to reports to OSHA. As she said, "if I knew the 
answers to all of their questions, we wouldn't have filed an 
OSHA complaint to begin with."6 
Even if an inspection had been performed there were 
additional reasons to doubt its quality and timeliness. 
OSHA, badly underfunded during the Reagan years, had a long 
backlog of inspection requests. Morale among the remaining 
inspectors (only two remained in Connecticut) was low. It 
was understood that no one would be promoted if they were 
viewed as a zealot. Much more important, however, than the 
lack of funding was lack of expertise. Even pre-Reagan OSHA 
lacked the personnel to deal with a health problem such as 
toxic hepatitis, with no physicians involved at the 
inspection level. There was also always the chance that the 
offending substances might not be on OSHA's list of 
regulated hazards; only 500 have been recognized to date of 
the more than 50,000 substances in widespread use. On top 
of it all, procedural snarls could delay abatement of 
■ 
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enforceable hazards for months or even years. With the 
prospects of a bungled investigation, or worse a stamp of 
approval on existing conditions, and a health problem that 
called for swift action, it seemed wiser to delay contacting 
OSHA if by doing so the clinic could identify the process 
responsible for hepatotoxicity. To do otherwise was to risk 
sentencing the remaining Uretek workers to continued 
morbidity or mortality. There was eventually a debate among 
the staff about notifying OSHA and the press when the needs 
of the fired workers conflicted with those that still worked 
at the plant. For the moment, however, the public's right 
to know was viewed as secondary to the clinic's respon¬ 
sibility to the workers. 
It was unclear if Dr Beckett would be successful. 
First he was told that he would have to speak to Mr Andrews, 
then a week later that Mr Andrews would be "away in Europe 
for a few months". Dr Beckett explained that we were 
concerned about a potential hazard at the plant that 
couldn't wait a few months: two workers had toxic hepatitis, 
an illness that could be fatal if exposure continued. We 
would need to know what chemicals were in use and would like 
to see the production process. He reminded them that the 
Yale program did not issue fines or charge a fee but would 
simply make recommendations. Fortunately, this approach 
works with most employers. Uretek however was unmoved; they 
would have to check with their attorney as the formulae were 
. 
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"proprietary". In the face of two seriously ill patients 
and the companies uncooperative stance, even the unpertur- 
bable Dr Beckett was getting frustrated. When Uretek called 
back to say "thanks, but no thanks" Dr Beckett mentioned 
that he felt compelled to contact OSHA, knowing that this 
was probably a hollow threat, given the typical OSHA 
response, but cognizant that it was our only leverage. Ten 
minutes later, somewhat to everyone's surprise, the plant 
called back. A visit would be fine, they had "misunderstood" 
and hoped that there was no need to notify OSHA. At the 
time it was concluded that the employer was simply unaware 
of OSHA's impotence, and ignorantly timorous. Unbeknownst 
to anyone in the clinic was the fact that Uretek was 
awaiting sentencing as the first convicted violator of the 
state's toxic waste disposal act, and Mr Andrews was facing 
a possible 15 year jail term. A meeting was arranged for 
November 6th. 
By the time that the plant visit occurred Dr Cullen had 
received a worrisome phone call from a clinic in the heart 
of the Hispanic community. They'd seen an unusual number of 
gastro-intestinal problems that fall, did Cullen have any 
thoughts? Concern about the remaining employees was running 
high on the cold November morning of the plant tour, and 
although the clinic staff had seen some gritty workplaces, 
Uretek was surprisingly bad. Gary Dorsey, feature writer 
' 
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for The Hartford Courant, paints an accurate portrait, at 
least from outside: 
The factory was almost hidden by trees, sitting 
like an overbaked brick wedged into the eastern 
banks of the Quinnipiac River. From across the 
water it looked like a rust-colored vestige of a 
New England industrial era whose time had passed. 
Tool and Die. Cut and Sew. Weave and Spin. 
Stockpiles of rotting, trash-filled drums, 
boarded-up windows, and tangles of weeds and 
vines signaled abandonment. 
But the exterior appearance masked the intensity of activity 
on the inside. Much reassurance and persuasion was required 
to establish what chemicals were used in the plant. At 
first claiming that he did not know, Andrews eventually gave 
a list of chemical names: Toluene, Dimethyl Formamide, 
Chlorobenzene, and Methyl Ethyl Ketone, all used to make 
polyurethane or clean machinery. There was also reluctance 
about a walkthrough but Beckett and Sparer prevailed upon 
Andrews and company attorney Clifford Grandjean. 
Uretek was ready for the inspection, or at least they 
thought they were. Employees were wearing new looking vapor 
masks and safety glasses, or could be seen putting them on 
as we walked through the plant. Trash pails were filled 
with the boxes the safety equipment came in and it was 
fairly obvious that they'd never been worn before: 
everything in the plant, including the workers, was covered 
with layers of dried polyurethane except for the safety 
equipment. The air was thick with organic vapor sufficient 
to cause a headache and light-headedness amongst those on 
. 
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the tour.8 Workers were standing by open drums of poly¬ 
urethane, ladling it onto fabric travelling by on rollers. 
No one wore gloves. Ventilation consisted of a few window 
fans which were turned off, even in the shed where the 
urethane was mixed. The area of strongest fumes was around 
the ovens through which the fabric passed to dry (see 
photos). There were exhaust hoods over the ovens but it was 
clear from the smell that much organic vapor was ending up 
inside the shop.9 Unfortunately Ms. Sparer was not 
permitted to make measurements, other than with her nose and 
eyes. Sparer, an OSHA hygienist before coming to Yale, 
stated: "It was what we'd call, at OSHA, a real pit."10 
The walk through also revealed several other facts: 
all but a few workers, who numbered sixty-six, were 
Hispanic, and most did not speak English. Few seemed aware 
of the hazards at the workplace - they warmed their lunches 
in the solvent ovens and ate them as they ladled poly¬ 
urethane onto the fabric. It was also clear that the plant 
had not been inspected recently. It was dark, hot, 
cluttered with open drums of chemicals everywhere and lacked 
safety showers, eyewash stations, and other rudimentary 
safety equipment. 
A report was prepared and sent to Uretek on Novem¬ 
ber 19. It recommended immediate installation of ventila¬ 
tion and safety equipment and a blood screening program to 
evaluate all employees for liver abnormalities. The 
. 
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company's initial reluctance was replaced by quiet coopera¬ 
tion and two days later they invited physicians back to talk 
with workers about the blood tests. The first screening 
occurred in early December and on December 5th, a Friday, 
results trickled in from the lab: 30 of 45 individuals had 
some abnormality in their liver enzymes, about 33% of them 
more than twice normal. An isolated problem had become an 
unprecedented outbreak, contradicting the wisdom of 
Zimmerman and others. The clinic staff was more than 
concerned, they were alarmed. Dr Beckett phoned Uretek that 
afternoon at 4:45 p.m. and described the situation to the 
production manager, recommending that the plant shut down 
until ventilation equipment already ordered could be 
installed. The manager stated that Uretek would comply.11 
In the ensuing months the clinic completed an epidemio¬ 
logical study of the workers and an environmental survey of 
the workplace. The results of the clinic study are 
presented below, while the findings of the environmental 
survey, primarily concerning DMF, constitute the next 
chapter. 
Methods: Based on the cases seen in clinic, the blood drawn 
for the screening was tested for the following: AST, ALT, 
gamma-glutamyl transpeptidase, direct and total bilirubins, 
alkaline phosphatase, lactic dehydrogenase, total protein, 
and albumin. Individual liver function test results and an 
' 
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interpretation, along with a questionnaire to determine 
demographic background, job history, and symptoms were sent 
to all workers in English and Spanish. Workers with AST or 
ALT greater than twice normal were referred to the occupa¬ 
tional medicine clinic, along with anyone else who wished to 
be seen. Clinic evaluation consisted of history and 
physical exam, Liver Function Tests, Hepatitis A & B 
serologies, a complete blood count, prothrombin time and 
partial thromboplastin time. Additional blood tests 
included BUN, creatinine, glucose and electrolytes. Five had 
abdominal ultrasounds and liver biopsies. 
Screening results: Ultimately, medical data was obtained on 
58 of 66 employees (see Figure #1). As the company provided 
only names, but not job classification or length of 
employment, this information was collected by questionnaire 
or during a clinic visit (only 46 of 58). Average length of 
employment was 40 months, although 15 of 46 (33%) had worked 
for three months or less. The age range was from 18 to 60 
with a mean of 33 years. Workers who had worked in 
production anytime in the preceding six months were 
considered production workers, all of whom were male, all 
but three Hispanic. These individuals worked five 12-hour 
shifts plus one or two 8-hour shifts per week.12 The 
remaining twelve workers were classified as non-production - 
inspecting, packing, shipping, or office workers. A third 
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were Hispanic, two female. The eight individuals who did 
not participate were non-production personnel. 
Overall, 36 or 62% of workers tested had an abnormal 
AST or ALT, 19 or 33% had one or more tests greater than 
twice normal and 9 or 16% had one test greater than fivefold 
normal (see Figure #2). As shown in Figure #2, enzyme 
elevation correlated with job classification with 11 of 12 
non-production workers entirely normal, while 35 or 76% of 
production workers showed an elevation. Mean ALT for non¬ 
production workers was 30 ± 7 U/L versus 113 ± 171 U/L, a 
significant difference (p< .01) by Student's T-test. Of 
interest, the data demonstrate an inverse correlation 
between transaminase level and duration of employment with 
short-term workers showing the greatest abnormality (Figure 
#3). As a longitudinal study was not possible, no further 
information could be collected on this issue. Symptoms 
reported on the questionnaire were 1)GI (anorexia, abdominal 
pain, or nausea) in 67%, 2)CNS (headaches,dizziness) in 39%, 
3)Alcohol intolerance ("disulfiram-like reaction" charac¬ 
terized by facial flushing, palpitations, nausea) in 24%. 
All workers with elevations were either removed or trans¬ 
ferred to non-production areas. Before engineering 
modifications were completed, the majority of the production 
workers went out on strike (two months after initial 
screening - see next chapter). 
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Medical evaluation and follow-up: Four workers were 
evaluated in clinic before the screening and 23 following 
it, including all nineteen of those with enzymes twice 
normal. Viral serologies showed all 27 with negative 
hepatitis B surface antigen and negative hepatitis A IgM 
antibody. Two had positive hepatitis B surface and core 
antibody indicating immunity subsequent to a past infection. 
None had received blood transfusions or were using prescrip¬ 
tion medication. Only two acknowledged significant alcohol 
or illicit drug use. The five hepatic ultrasounds performed 
were negative. 
The interpretation of the liver biopsies proved to be 
controversial. They were performed from two to eleven 
months after initial screening in the five cases that 
demonstrated persistent enzyme elevation. They all revealed 
microscopic changes consistent with resolving toxic injury 
to the liver. These included focal steatosis, spotty 
unicellular necrosis and evidence of diffuse regeneration, 
including irregular liver cell plates, binucleated hepato- 
cytes and variation in nuclear size and staining charac¬ 
teristics. A fat stain of a frozen section revealed 
diffuse steatosis in a microvesicular pattern not evident on 
the conventional paraffin sections. Only one biopsy showed 
evidence of a chronic process evidenced by scattered 
acidophilic bodies, aggregates of mononuclear inflammatory 
cells within sinusoids, and replacement of individual 
. 
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hepatocytes by inflammatory infiltrate. There was no 
fibrosis. However, as Dossing (1986) points out: 
Except for a few rare causes of hepatotoxicity 
such as vinyl chloride and methylene dianiline 
there is no specific or even typical clinical, 
chemical, or pathological feature of occupational 
hepatotoxicity. (131) 
The biopsies were reviewed by a number of pathologists, 
including Hyman Zimmerman, the hepatic authority who had 
pronounced industrial toxic hepatitis a vestige of the past. 
He found all the biopsies consistent with a diagnosis of 
Non-A, Non-B hepatitis, a relatively uncommon form of viral 
or infectious hepatitis for which there is no test in 
clinical use. Non-A Non-B hepatitis is usually transmitted 
in North America by blood products, needle sharing, 
tattooing, etc. There are only a handful of epidemic 
outbreaks none of which occurred in the First world. Given 
the cluster of cases in one workplace, the lack of risk 
factors (i.e. IV drugs or transfusions) and the acknowledged 
low incidence of Non-A Non-B hepatitis Dr Zimmerman's 
interpretation seems unlikely.13 Conclusions of the Yale 
pathologists varied widely: several felt that all biopsies 
showed signs of toxic workplace injury, others felt one or 
more represented Non-A Non-B based on particular features. 
It should be pointed out that, as with toxic hepatitis, the 
diagnosis of Non-A Non-B is not based on any published study 
of the microscopic appearance of various hepatitides, but 
only on the pathologists' own judgement. While the value of 
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tissue and the opinion of a skilled pathologist in reaching 
a diagnosis is unquestionable, it is often ascribed an 
importance that exceeds the limits of scientific certainty. 
The case of the worker's biopsy with chronic inflammatory 
infiltrate is illustrative. This worker, an 18-year-old 
with a two-month exposure history and AST/ALT of 313/582 at 
screening and 49/156 in October 1987 (11 months later), has 
been denied workers' compensation based on one pathologist's 
diagnosis of Non A Non B. While pathologists may recognize 
that the pattern of injury does not unambiguously reveal the 
cause of injury, and while debate is healthy, the consequen¬ 
ces of denied compensation are far from academic for this 
worker. Conflicting standards of proof in clinico-epidemio- 
logical versus laboratory medicine and in the legal/ad¬ 
ministrative sphere appear frequently. Epidemiology seeks 
to discern causes in the pattern of clusters of cases not 
individuals. Pathology focuses on individual cases and is 
fairly indifferent to probabilistic thinking and new 
disease patterns until widely accepted. The courts 
establish cause by the definition "it is more likely than 
not that A caused B" which in practice can translate to A 
caused B, yes or no. When these three views of causation 
collide the outcome for the individual can be unsatisfactory 




Most workers' enzymes resolved to normal levels within 
one to five months of removal or transfer. Eight in¬ 
dividuals had enzyme abnormalities which persisted six 
months or longer and three, including the 18-year-old, 
remain elevated in March 1988, but all seem to be resolving, 
if more slowly, than most affected workers. 
Discussion: The epidemiological study, while not perfect, 
provides strong evidence that Uretek represents an outbreak 
of work-related liver disease. Given the nature of the work 
force, largely non-English speaking and in some cases 
transient, and the limitations imposed by the employer, the 
/S 
amount of information gathered in impressive. Three factors 
point to a chemical at work as the causative agent: l)the 
proportion affected (76% of production workers, 33% 
seriously) 2)the significant difference between production 
and non-production workers (the one affected non-production 
worker showed very mild elevations) 3)the lack of risk 
factors infectious or other forms of hepatic injury. With 
regard to this last point, doubts might be cast on the 
reliability of self-reported alcohol consumption. A study 
published in 1979 in Digestive Diseases demonstrated that an 
AST/ALT ratio of 2 or greater is "highly suggestive of 
alcoholic hepatitis and cirrhosis.1,15 The test was 
particularly helpful in cases where ALT was less than 300, 




In the 1979 study, 91% of patients with alcoholic liver 
disease had an AST/ALT ratio greater than 1.0.16 Figure #4 
shows a graph of AST/ALT ratios for all Uretek workers with 
elevation - only 1 of 36 was greater than 1.0. While no 
biochemical assay is specific enough to allow definitive 
conclusions, this result does not contradict the workers' 
self-reports of minimal to moderate alcohol consumption 
(except in two cases of self-reported abuse). 
Another issue which raises some doubts is the inconsis¬ 
tency between presumed degree of exposure and liver injury. 
In the absence of dosage measurements one might assume that 
length of employment might be correlated with illness. In 
the Uretek case, however, elevated liver function tests were 
clustered in workers of short tenure, as shown in Figure 
#3. There are several possible explanations. First, there 
is almost certainly a variability in the hepatic sensitivity 
to environmental toxins, though we would expect to find it 
randomly distributed amongst the workers if this were the 
sole factor responsible for the cluster of greater sen¬ 
sitivity in new workers. Second, there is a "healthy worker 
effect", that is, workers who had severe reactions left the 
plant, or as in Betancourt's case (and others), fired. 
Statisiticians call this "selection bias". The intolerance 
of most new workers was so well-known, in fact, that the 
old-timers ran a betting pool to see who could predict how 
long a new man would last. This could explain the presence 
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of highly sensitive individuals in the recently employed 
group, while veterans showed much milder elevations. The 
fact that no records were kept on the number of workers who 
quit or were terminated makes it impossible to find the 
missing cohort of workers who left due to illness.17 A 
final possibility is that Figure #3 represents the natural 
history of the disease process, which involves acute injury 
followed by a period of gradual resolution. Which of these 
factors is responsible for the observed pattern and to what 
degree is impossible to ascertain with the cross-sectional 
data collected. All of the symptoms reported and signs 
observed are consistent with toxic injury due to chemicals 
used at Uretek. 
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WORKPLACE PHOTOS: As none were permitted on the initial 
visit, all of the photographs were taken after the installa¬ 
tion of recommended ventilation equipment. The left hand 
photo shows the primary means of ventilation before the 
changes. Many of these fans did not work. The one on the 
right shows the apppearance of the shop after it was cleaned 
up and safety equipment installed. 
■ 
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These two photos show the polyurethane mixture being pumped 
from a barrel onto the fabric as it travels through rollers 
and on to the drying oven. The horizontal bar with flexible 
tubing is part of the new local ventilation system. 
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The top photo displays a worker wearing measurement 
instruments standing near oven. The bottom photo shows 
another worker with vapor mask standing at "new" machine 
(note skin exposure). Formerly this worker stood next to a 
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FIGURE 11: Flow chart showing LFT data obtained on the 
workers. LFT's were collected on 58 out of 66 total 
employees. 46 of these were production workers; 12 were 
non-production workers. Of the 46 production workers 11 had 
normal liver enzymes; 35 had one or more elevated trans¬ 
aminases. Of the 12 non-production workers 11 had normal 
liver enzymes and only one had mild elevations. 
* 
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UVER ENZYMES IN PRODUCTION AND NON PRODUCTION WORKERS 
Production Workers (46) Non Production Workers (12) 





FIGURE #2: Frequency distribution of workers with liver 
abnormalities. The graph shows numbers of production and 
non-production workers with AST or ALT values greater than 
or less than twice normal. 
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FIGURE #3: Relationship between months of employment and ALT 
in production workers who had completed the questionnaire 
(N=32). Months of employment was determined on the basis of 
questionnaire data and calculated from month of initial hire 
to the date liver function tests were drawn. ALT used was 
from the initial screening or from the first clinic visit if 






Ratio of AST to ALT 
FIGURE _i4i.Frequency distribution of the ratio of AST to ALT 
i*"1 production workers (N=3 6) with one or more elevated 
transaminases. If the patient had more than one set of 
liver enzymes, the set with the highest AST and ALT was 
used. The ratio of AST to ALT was less than or equal to one 
m all but one patient, the opposite of the ratio normally 




1. Mitchell et al. (1987), 266. see also D0ssing (1986). 
2. This is the patients actual name as his identity has 
been previously revealed, with informed consent, in 
numerous press accounts. 
3. A computerized search of the clinic records revealed 
that an Hispanic Uretek worker was seen in 1984. No 
liver function tests were done and the patients 
symptoms resolved and were presumed to be viral 
gastro-enteritis. In retrospect, they probably 
represented solvent effects. 
4. Chapter five on the history of federal and state 
legislation will deal more extensively with these issues. 
5. Fellows have completed a three year residency training 
program and are seeking two to three years of sub¬ 
specialty training in occupational medicine and public 
health. 
6. Dorsey (1987) . 
7. Ibid. 
8. Because no air level measurements were permitted by 
the company, it is not known if levels exceeded the 
OSHA limit of 10 ppm. 
9. The amount ending up outside qualified Uretek as a 
"big guy" among Connecticut polluters according to 
Steve Peplau, a senior air pollution control engineer 
with the state. Peplau estimated discharge into the 
air "around 300 tons per year." Quoted in Dorsey (1987). 
10. Ibid. 
11. Later it was revealed that Uretek kept the night shift 
running on unventilated machines until the strike shut 
the plant down in February. 
12. As they were generally paid minimum wage, overtime was 
the major attraction of work at Uretek. 
Dienstag et al. in Harrison's Principles of Internal 





14. See also Brennan & Carter (1985) Legal and Scientific 
Probability of Causation of Cancer and Other Environ¬ 
mental Disease In Individuals and chapter six. 
15. Cohen & Kaplan (1979) 
16. Ibid. 
17. Rumors abounded of workers who had returned to Puerto 
Rico where they could afford medical care. They almost 




CHAPTER THREE: DMF AND THE WORKPLACE 
As previously described, Uretek was engaged in the 
production of polyurethane coatings and their application to 
fabric. Of the list of chemicals provided by Uretek, only 
one chemical had been identified already as a hepatotoxin, 
Dimethyl Formamide (DMF). While the other compounds. 
Chlorobenzene, Toluene, and Methyl Ethyl Ketone might have a 
role in the outbreak, particularly as synergists, there are 
only a few studies documenting hepatotoxicity, and then 
primarily in animals. A toxicological study will be 
necessary to establish with greater certainty the health 
effects of DMF. Like most industrial compounds, DMF has not 
been studied in combination with other chemicals, with the 
exception of alcohol. However, enough is known about DMF to 
make a convincing argument that it is at least partly if not 
entirely the cause of the hepatotoxicity at Uretek. 
An excellent and versatile solvent, DMF is used 
ubiquitously in polyurethane products and acrylic fibers 
(65-75%) as well as pharmaceuticals (15-20%) and pesticides, 
among other applications. It is an extremely important 
solvent known for its excellent solubility of a wide variety 
of organic and inorganic compounds. Approximately one third 
of the world's capacity to produce acrylic fibers depends on 
DMF.1 First synthesized in 1893, DMF only came into 
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widespread commercial use in the early 1940's. It was 
generally considered non-toxic by research groups associated 
with manufacturers until very recently. 
Although US production was estimated at 33 million 
pounds in 1979, and worldwide output at 106 million pounds, 
the number of workers exposed is unknown.2 A recent report 
from the occupational medicine program at Mt. Sinai hospital 
in New York contains an estimate of over 100,000 U.S. 
workers exposed to DMF currently, or in the last decade.3 
Santodonato, et al (1985), note that with the large quantity 
produced and the number of applications, "exposure would 
appear to be quite widespread."4 
A review of the literature failed to turn up specific 
data on the pharmacokinetics of DMF absorption, except for a 
Japanese study indicating that trans-dermal absorption is 
significant.5 There is consensus that respiratory and 
gastric absorption occurs. DMF is metabolized to N- 
Methylformamide (MMF) and N-Hydroxymethyl-Methylformamide.6 
In humans exposed to DMF, N-Methylformamide has been 
reported as the principal urinary metabolite and has been 
proposed, along with elevated urinary mercaptopurines, as a 
means of biological monitoring in workers.7 Studies 
demonstrate a directly proportional relationship between 
total exposure and urinary MMF, though MMF fell to undetec¬ 
table levels within 14 hours of exposure.8 Spot urines do 
not correlate well with exposure, however, and there is 
. 
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great variability if urine levels in exposed individuals. 
Some critics of the Uretek study have argued that urine 
testing should have been done to establish DMF as the 
causative agent. Measurement of MMF excretion in Uretek 
workers would have required 24 hour urine collection and 
would have helped to establish DMF as the causitive agent. 
However, the conclusions would not have been altered as 
workers had tangible dermal and respiratory exposure 
sufficient to account for the findings. 
Toxicological studies have established that DMF is 
hepatotoxic in cats, mice, rats, guinea pigs, and rabbits, 
causing a centrilobular necrosis and fatty degeneration.9 
Reports involving humans have been surprisingly few and 
generally involve one or two cases in a given workplace. 
All but one case reported occurred outside the United 
States.10 All the human studies document abdominal pain, 
nausea, vomiting, dizziness, headaches, anorexia, diarrhea, 
and, in a few cases, agitation. Liver function tests were 
rarely evaluated except in two studies which documented 
elevations after large accidental exposures.11 The 
"disulfiram-like" effect of DMF has long been recognized and 
is attributed to possible acetaldehyde inhibition by MMF.12 
The ubiquity and high toxicity of DMF poses the 
question of why so few cases of hepatic injury appear in the 
literature. The lone U.S. case report occurred in a 
Pennsylvania Urethane coating plant.13 Conditions at Uretek 
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certainly may have been worse than average, and the 
recommended precautions may be better observed in other 
operations (manufacturers now recommend skin and respiratory 
protection). Even the Pennsylvania plant had instituted 
periodic LFT assays as far back as 1972. However, San- 
todonato, et al (1985), points out that solvent applications 
of DMF, such as cleaning of machinery, "are likely to be 
conducted with few or no engineering controls, thus 
undoubtedly resulting in worker exposure." The National 
Cancer Institute report concludes prophetically with the 
following paragraph: 
There are no reports of well-designed epidemio¬ 
logic studies on worker groups exposed to 
Dimethylformamide. Case reports from the foreign 
literature have associated DMF exposure with 
increased morbidity from various causes. Worker 
exposure to DMF during acrylic fiber production is 
apparently sufficient to justify consideration of 
this cohort for further investigation. Exposures 
of similar or greater magnitude may occur in 
other industries (e.g. pharmaceutical production, 
chemical synthesis), although cohorts are likely 
to be small and simultaneous exposure to multiple 
chemicals is likely to occur. 
Tolot (1968) concluded that: 
The frequency of these symptoms is probably quite 
widespread, probably greater than one might 
anticipate in view of the relative silence which 
surrounds the question in France, a silence which 
should be deplored. 
With Uretek, the silence in the U.S. surrounding DMF has 
been broken. There are signs that DMF and methylamines are 
already subjects of national interest and controversy. 
■ 
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The Uretek outbreak coincided with the publication of 
the first adequate studies of DMF carcinogenicity. Prior to 
1986, short-term mutagenicity and genotoxicity studies were 
negative and an animal bioassay was in progress. One study 
reported chromosome damage in DMF workers, but the health 
significance had not been established.14 The news since 
Uretek has not been good. An unpublished 32-year prospec¬ 
tive study of 5,000 workers by a DuPont epidemiologist 
released in September 1986 documented significant excesses 
of bucco-pharyngeal and malignant melanoma in DMF-exposed 
cohorts, and an excess of prostate cancer in a cohort 
exposed to DMF plus Acrylonitrile (ACN).15 In October 1986 
a report appeared in the Journal of Urology describing 
clusters of embryonal cell carcinomas of the testis in two 
separate aircraft repair facilities among mechanics who had 
worked extensively with DMF.16 Fourteen months later, in 
December 1987, a letter appeared in The Lancet describing 
three cases of testicular cancer in tannery workers exposed 
to DMF. Since then two additional cases have been iden¬ 
tified by researchers at Mt Sinai Medical Center in New 
York. The Mt. Sinai researchers and a labor union peti¬ 
tioned federal agencies to issue a bulletin warning workers 
of potential carcinogenicity of DMF.17 All of these recent 
developments point to even greater hazards from DMF than the 
risk of hepatotoxicity highlighted by the Uretek outbreak. 
* 
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Uretek workers are being informed of these recently reported 
risks by the Yale clinic staff. 
A coincidental report received by the author indicates 
that there may even be a DMF hazard to the general public. 
Ellen Silbergeld, PhD senior scientist for the Washington- 
based Environmental Defense Fund, reports that the EPA has 
recently licensed an algicide/herbicide which breaks down 
into MMF. This product, marketed as Sonar (Fluridone), is 
not the only licensed cidal agent which includes MMF as a 
degradation product. However, the EPA felt that Fluridone 
is sufficiently safe to justify use as an algicide in 
drinking water reservoirs. The township of Lake George, New 
York, has already attempted to employ it for this purpose, 
though it is being opposed by citizens' groups who called on 
Dr Silbergeld to testify. The EPA has declined to review 
its classification in light of the new cancer reports even 
though they acknowledge that they were not aware of them 
when they approved the product. Dr. Silbergeld has 
recommended that the EPA's research arm, the NIEHS, 
undertake a new study of Fluridone. Clearly the safety of 
DMF and its metabolites will be significant issues in the 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE STRIKE AND THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
By the end of January the conflict between the needs of 
workers fired or unable to work and those still on the job 
had come to a head. Beth Lewis, the clinic social worker, 
was exasperated with unsuccessful attempts to get groceries, 
clothes, and benefits for the workers. While the company 
was installing the requested engineering controls, they were 
also contesting the workers' compensation claims. They had 
even gone so far as to hire the director of occupational 
health at Yale University. Deborah McGregor MD MPH (no 
affiliation to the Yale Occupational Medicine Program) as a 
consultant.1 She proceeded to dispute the clinic's 
findings, claiming that the outbreak was due to alcohol and 
tylenol abuse. Uretek was not the paragon of cooperation 
despite their claims of such to the media. Ms Lewis also 
recognized that there were more issues to resolve than just 
those involving health and safety. Workers had no benefits, 
were required to work 12-hour shifts, and were fired 
indiscriminately. They needed more help than the clinic or 
an attorney could provide. The program staff agreed that 
Lewis should seek contacts in "the Hispanic community." It 
happened that Daniel Perez had recently arrived in New Haven 
as an organizer for the International Ladies Garment Workers 
Union (ILGWU) and Lewis' inquiries quickly led her to Perez. 
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Within 72 hours an overwhelming majority of Uretek workers 
authorized the ILGWU to represent them in what was to be the 
prelude to a bitter four-month strike. Perez called on 
OSHA, the media, and the mayor. He obtained benefits for 
the workers and demonstrated an tireless perspicacity that 
even Uretek's owners ultimately came to respect. 
The Big Story 
The Uretek story hit local papers and television on 
February 19, 1987. A week later a report of the medical 
details appeared in the Center of Disease Control's 
Morbidity and Mortality weekly report. In the weeks that 
followed, the story was picked up by the Boston Globe, the 
New York Times, and other major papers. Reporters set about 
finding out who knew what, and when. It wasn't long before 
documents were uncovered which indicated that Uretek had 
been investigated by both state and federal inspectors years 
before the outbreak. 
The OSHA inspection, which covered only safety regula¬ 
tions and not health rules, occurred in February of 1979 and 
found 11 safety violations. The safety inspector, suffi¬ 
ciently concerned about toxic health risks, recommended a 
separate health inspection and requested a list of chemicals 
from company vice-president and chief chemist, John Andrews, 
despite the fact that he had been sent to examine safety 
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compliance only. Andrews responded with a letter listing 
eight coating names, but stating that "the exact chemical 
composition of the coatings is unknown to us, as the 
suppliers consider the coatings as proprietary".2 Andrews 
stated that he was assured by manufacturers that the 
coatings did not contain any "unduly hazardous or toxic 
chemicals that would affect the safety of the people working 
in the plant".3 OSHA supervisors, evidently satisfied, made 
no further requests and, until the outbreak, a health 
inspection was never performed. 
The state, as it turned out, virtually stumbled into 
Uretek. Inspectors from the state Department of Environmen¬ 
tal Protection inspected the Chem-Tech Rubber Company in May 
of 1984 for hazardous waste storage compliance. Chem-Tech 
occupies the ground floor above the Uretek basement 
operation and is owned by the same individual, Harold Hoder. 
One inspector, Peter Zack, was so overwhelmed by the 
chemical odors that he noted in his report that anyone from 
DEP "should have respirators to ensure [the inspectors's] 
safety and health". He also contacted DEP's air compliance 
division, recommending that they investigate possible air 
pollution problems outside the plant. No one ever followed 
up on the suggestion. 
Zack did, however, document that Uretek's storage yard 
was full of leaking drums of Toluene, Methyl Ethyl Ketone, 
and Dimethyl Formamide. He later substantiated that the 
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company improperly disposed of hundreds of gallons of toxic 
waste by selling it to a fuel blending company. This fact, 
combined with the deceptions and uncooperativeness of Uretek 
management, led Zack, in November of 1984, to refer the case 
to the Attorney General's office. 
While this case was being argued, the state DEP air 
compliance division finally found Uretek because of 
complaints by neighborhood residents of strong odors. They 
discovered, as already mentioned, that Uretek was emitting 
pollutants at a remarkable rate. Gary Dorsey describes the 
situation at that point: 
Negotiations were held, compliance orders served. 
But change was slow. The bureaucracy worked over 
Uretek according to traditional labyrinthine 
scheduling. Seventeen months later, when the 
occupational medicine program brought Uretek to a 
standstill, the state was still dickering with the 
company about its air pollution and hazardous 
waste problems.4 
The Government Response 
From the revelations of the preceding section, it is 
perhaps no surprise that a number of state and federal 
officials found themselves in the hot seat. Although the 
revelations of state inspectors' concerns were embarrassing, 
Uretek primarily served as an opportunity for state 
officials to score political points, as the state had no 
jurisdiction over health matters in the plant. State 
Attorney Joseph Lieberman was an early critic and lost no 
' 
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time in emphasizing his pursuit of Uretek in court since 
1984 for hazardous waste violations. The mayor of New 
Haven, Biagio DiLieto, attempted unsuccessfully to act as a 
mediator in the strike. 
Political pressure at the state level focused on state 
Superior Court Justice Thomas P. Maino, who had delayed 
reaching a verdict in the original hazardous waste case for 
more than two years. What could have been a quiet back-page 
decision became the object of close scrutiny by the public, 
by other factory owners and by politicians. Uretek faced 
possible fines of $50,000 per day for 100 days of violations 
from May 15 to August 22, 1984, which totalled $5,000,000. 
Vice-president Andrews faced a personal fine of $5,000,000 
and a 5-year prison term. On April 14 the judge found 
Uretek guilty and levied fines of $225,000 and $5,000 fines 
against Uretek and Andrews, respectively.5 There was no 
prison sentence. Uretek became the first company in the 
state convicted of hazardous waste violations in a criminal 
court.6 Although Judge Maino's decision was criticized by 
some as lenient, there is some belief that the penalty 
would have been smaller had it not been for the hepatitis 
outbreak.7 The decision set an important precedent in the 
state for criminal penalties in toxic waste cases. 

Strike & Response 57 
Federal Hot Potato 
If there was discomfort at the state level, there was 
near panic in federal circles. U.S. Senator Lowell P. 
Weicker hand-delivered a letter to Labor Secretary Brock in 
March complaining about OSHA's 10-week inspection backlog. 
The New England OSHA director, John B. Miles, Jr., who had 
jurisdiction over Connecticut, had assumed his post two 
weeks before the Uretek story hit the press in mid-February. 
Unknown at the time was the fact that Miles had previously 
been director of the prestigious Manhattan OSHA office. He 
had been "reassigned" in March of 1986 after an internal 
probe of the Pymm Thermometer Factory outbreak of mercury 
poisoning, in which several workers died (of unsubstantiated 
causes), and at least forty others were seriously affected.8 
It was Miles' bad luck to be transferred into an explosive 
situation, but he responded with unusual vigor, requesting 
"loaner" inspectors from OSHA's Emergency Health Response 
Team in Salt Lake City, and calling on Dr. Ralph Yodaiken, 
one of two OSHA staff physicians, to review the workers' 
health records. The latter is extremely unusual for OSHA, 
which has no provision for involvement of medical personnel 
in local work. On July 28, 1987, six months after they 
were notified, OSHA cited Uretek for 34 willful and 145 
serious violations of the OSH Act.9 Fines totalling 
$480,000 were proposed, including $10,000 each for the 34 
willful violations and $1,000 each for the 136 serious 
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violations, all the maximum allowable by law. Given that 
the average proposed OSHA penalty is less than $100, and 
less than $900 for willful violations, the proposed Uretek 
fines were notably harsh.10 They came at a time when OSHA 
was increasingly under fire for alleged inactivity. Of 
note, both the company and its new ally after the strike, 
the union, contested the proposed fines.11 
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Endnotes 
1. This turned out to be a brilliant maneuver as the 
public did not grasp the difference between McGregor's 
and Cullen's affiliations with Yale and their views 
were portrayed as an intradepartmental feud in initial 
reports. 
2. Letter to OSHA quoted in McGraw & Kauffman, April 10, 
1987. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Dorsey, 1987. 
5. These fines are currently under appeal. 
6. As of this writing, there are three outstanding civil 
cases involving hazardous waste from 1984, 1986, and 
1987. 
7. See Povinelli (1987). 
8. Miles' replacement, acting OSHA director Patrick 
Tyson, expressing sentiments familiar in the Uretek 
case, commented: "How the hell could something like 
this happen? How could we have gone this long without 
the system catching it?... It is clear to me we made 
some mistakes". Pymm officials were eventually 
convicted of criminal charges. See Hirschfield, 1987. 
9. A willful violation is defined by OSHA as one where a 
substantial probability exists that death or serious 
physical harm could result, and the employer knew, or 
should have known, of the hazard. 
10. Figures are derived from Table 2 in the Report of the 
President to the Congress, 1985, 42. 
11. Like the state fines, the Federal penalties are still 
under appeal. 

CHAPTER FIVE: THE HISTORY 
FEDERAL STATE AND PRIVATE REGULATION 
OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
At first glance the term occupational safety and health 
seems to be a single concept. However, ensuring health in 
the workplace means prevention of disease; workplace safety 
involves prevention of accidents and resulting injuries. 
There are several important implications of the disease/in¬ 
jury distinction. The first, and most important, involves 
the thorny issue of causation. Normally, the causes of 
injuries are temporally proximate and established with ease 
in comparison with disease, especially occupational disease. 
In the case of the latter, causal events are often incremen¬ 
tal, diffused over months or years, or involve threshold 
exposures. Results sometimes do not manifest for years or 
decades, and other causal influences clog the intervening 
time. (Disease is a result of a complex interplay between 
internal [host] and external [environment]). It follows, 
then, that the study of occupational disease is the 
characterization of disease clusters, and the methodology is 
primarily that of epidemiology. The study of injury, on the 
other hand, is the characterization of random events which 
occur with a certain probability, established primarily by 
statistical methods.1 While the study of occupational 
injury has included the "injury-prone worker" as well as the 
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dangerous workplace, the host/environment interplay is much 
more complex. 
Historically, the distinction is important, as we shall 
see, because of the difficulty institutions originally 
designed to mitigate the consequences of accidents have had 
accommodating to occupational disease. In the case of 
worker's compensation, the problem has been one of a round 
peg in a square hole. The result is that very few workers 
are receiving compensation for work-related diseases. The 
same difficulty can be seen with OSHA. While it has the 
word "health" in its name, it was never designed to detect 
or prevent health problems: 
OSHA's role, then and now, is to make rules about 
how work should be done safely and to enforce 
them, much like police. OSHA is not equipped to 
assess whether someone is hurt or sick, but 
whether rules are broken.2 
This theme will recur as the historical roots of occupation¬ 
al health in Connecticut are traced in this chapter: federal 
and state laws, and the influence of the early voluntary 
groups on these institutions. A further treatment of the 
implications of the accident/disease in prevention and 
identification of workplace problems is included in chapter 
six. 
Unhappily, the history of sick and injured workers is 
long, back to the beginning of recorded history. Throughout 
this long history, attention has primarily been directed to 
industrial accidents, not to workplace disease.3 It is 
. 
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curious the explosion of medical knowledge in the last 
thirty years, and its application in many new arenas has not 
led to a renaissance of occupational health. While a 
veritable mountain of medical writing has appeared on 
tobacco, alcohol, diet, exercise and their influence on 
health, not to mention literature on a plethora of new 
diseases, most of the profession has been strangely silent 
about occupational illness. Perhaps, as some have asserted 
this is due to a decline in the real incidence of industrial 
disease? While deaths on the job have certainly decreased 
since 1900, this seems less certain for non-fatal diseases. 
Even with the shift in the 1980's to a "service compounds 
and processes has vastly increased the number and severity 
of exposure to hazards.4 It will be argued in the next 
chapter that the lack of medical literature on workplace 
disease reflects a failure to recognize it when it occurs, 
and that this in turn is due to a complex set of factors, 
not all of them medical. 
Perhaps the media's conclusion blaming the outbreak 
primarily on irresponsible owners, dangerous chemicals, and 
a weakened OSHA is sufficient to partly answer the question 
why such an outbreak occurred. A complete answer though, 
one that provides meaningful information for the future, 
benefits from a look at institutions which existed in the 
past and how they functioned. The goal is an analysis which 
recognizes that events do not occur in a vacuum but in a 
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context, and that individuals and their actions influence 
and are influenced by societal structures and institutions 
in a complex way.5 For one, the nature of preventing 
workplace injury and disease involves economic, political, 
ethical, and social judgments. In addition, the particular 
judgments made by legislators and bureaucrats are buried in 
the maze of official documents or obtuse administrative 
manuals. The net result is a remote, inaccessible and at 
times daunting subject, and understandably, few attempts 
have been made to untangle the issues. In fact, few widely 
available books have been written on the history of the 
Federal OSH act itself, although a number of critiques of 
OSHA have appeared dealing primarily with the function of 
the act which include brief historical treatment.6 To fill 
this gap in the literature is beyond the scope of this 
modest undertaking. The focus of this chapter will be to 
fill a narrower but heretofore unexamined gap: the history 
of occupational health in Connecticut, which by necessity 
will include public and private efforts on the national 
level. 
Turning to the early 1900's we find it was a simpler 
time in occupational health to be sure, at least for company 
owners. No national health or safety legislation existed. 
The closest things to a federal occupational health standard 
were limited efforts such as the "Esch Act of 1912", which 
placed a prohibitive tax on white sulphur, driving it out of 
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use. Inhalation of white or yellow sulphur, formerly the 
chief constituent in matches, caused decay of the jaw and 
death or disfigurement.7 Other federal health projects of 
the day were the Federal Workers' Compensation Act of 1908, 
the Mine Safety Act of 1910, and the formation of the Public 
and Indian Health Services in 1914. Although they certainly 
represented improvements, these acts had a much greater 
impact on injury than disease in the workplace, and even 
this effect was constrained to a limited number of work 
sites. The Compensation Act, for example, extended only to 
federal employees. The Mine Safety Act made stipulations 
about construction and ventilation, but nothing was included 
concerning dust masks or other health protections. The 
states were just beginning to promulgate legislation at the 
time, and the scene was dominated by voluntary organizations 
and medical specialists mostly under the influence of 
industry. Like the handful of public acts, voluntary 
efforts that came to pass dealt primarily with safety, that 
is, industrial accidents, and not with diseases arising from 
work. 
Voluntary Efforts 
NSC: Prior to 1927, most of the regulatory work 
influencing Connecticut had been through voluntary organiza¬ 
tions. The first of these was the National Safety Council 
* 
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(NSC), founded in 1912 by prominent industrialists as a 
response to the alarming rates of accidental death and 
disfigurement that accompanied the proliferation of powerful 
machinery.8 Known today primarily for their automobile and 
bicycle safety campaigns, the NSC expropriated the "Safety 
First" slogan from United States Steel, which in 1910 had 
formed its own accident reduction campaign in response to 
negative publicity. With its slogan, the NSC took the 
ideological high ground from which to focus blame "on the 
careless worker rather than on corporate responsibility for 
dangerous designs and practices."9 Despite the fact that 
the NSC currently publishes some of the most heavily quoted 
workplace morbidity and mortality data, they have sponsored 
little or no industrial research and have downplayed the 
dangers of occupational disease.10 
ANSI: A second voluntary organization, the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI), was founded in 1918 
(under a different name) by a group of corporations and 
manufacturers to "develop industrial standards through 
consensus." Part of their efforts have focused on such 
issues as nut and bolt size compatibility while others have 
attempted to improve occupational safety by promulgation of 
standards for hazard exposures. Since 1969 these standards 
have been reviewed by a board including government and 
consumer but no labor members and with 9 of the 15 members 
from industry. The board decides when a standards committee 
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has reached "consensus” by weighting and counting the votes 
of the members. Unfortunately, the weighting decisions are 
not made public.11 Certainly this would all seem terribly 
arcane had not 180 ANSI standards been adopted intact by 
OSHA as regulations in 1971 by authority of Sec. 6(a) of the 
OSH act.12 Like the NSC, ANSI has ventured into data 
collection as well, by means of its "USA standard method of 
recording and measuring work injury experience-Z16.1." 
Originally developed by government statisticians but taken 
over by ANSI in the 1920's, the ANSI statistics were the 
only source of work injury rates in the US until the passage 
of the OSH act. Many view ANSI as seriously underestimating 
accident rates, while they do not even bother to collect 
disease data at all. 
ACGIH: A third organization also had a number of its 
standards adopted by OSHA: the American Council of Govern¬ 
ment Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), founded in 1938. The 
ACGIH was a professional organization, unlike the NSC and 
ANSI, and adopted standards by organizational plebiscite. 
The standards take the form of Threshold Limit Values 
(TLV's) which are eight hour time weighted averages defined 
as "the concentration of an airborne contaminant to which 
workers may be exposed repeatedly day after day, without 
adverse effects." They are established by extrapolation 
from animal toxicity studies and from reports of exposure in 
workers. OSHA adopted the 1967 ACGIH TLV's in 1971 and they 
■ 
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had previously been adopted by a number of foreign govern¬ 
ments. In addition, TLV exposure levels have been criti¬ 
cized for being too high. Hollstein points out that 
exposures are "considered acceptable if...[they] cause 
physiological changes in the exposed worker but the changes 
are not harmful."13 For instance, TLV's for carbon 
monoxide, nitrogen oxides, and sulfur dioxide are four to 
forty times as high as the limits set by the EPA for the air 
people breath when they are home from work. The number of 
ACGIH TLV's has almost doubled since 1967 and for many the 
TLV has been lowered. However, OSHA has not fundamentally 
revised its inherited list. As these standards were adopted 
unaltered, they represent one of the significant inade¬ 
quacies in OSHA discussed further in chapter six. 
NCCI: The final voluntary organization of note is the 
National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI). Whereas 
the NSC and ANSI are primarily supported by manufacturers, 
NCCI represents the interests of the insurance industry. 
Perhaps the last oligopoly untouched by anti-trust legisla¬ 
tion, the insurance industry, and the workings of its lobby 
group, have yet to be documented in any detail. However, 
NCCI's interest in the early part of the century is fairly 
clear; they vigorously promoted worker's compensation laws. 
In particular, they hoped to avoid federal regulation and 
underwriting and management of the funds by the states. In 
regard to the latter, the insurers demonstrated some 
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foresight: worker's compensation was to be a profitable 
business. 
Between 1950 and 1970 private insurers have kept an 
average of 40 cents of every dollar of worker's compensation 
premiums in contrast with 20 cents for state funds and less 
than 5 cents for the Federal Employees Compensation act.14 
In 1974, the nationwide premium benefit ratio was 0.53 (ie 
47 cents to administration) for private insurers versus 0.72 
(28 cents) for state funds.15 Even more dramatic is the 
fact that five states which prohibit private compensation 
insurance companies operated state funds with a 0.94 
benefit/premium ratio, with Ohio out front at 0.96.16 This 
means that it costs Ohio a little over 4 cents to return a 
dollar in benefits, whereas it costs insurance companies 89 
cents (47 cents of cost for 53 cents benefits returned) to 
do the same. Although state funds are exempt from taxes and 
deliver fewer services than private insurers, it appears 
that broker commissions and profits figure into the 
efficiency difference. Just how much profit is difficult to 
say. As already pointed out, the insurance industry has 
enjoyed near total freedom from independent scrutiny. It is 
sobering to consider, as Berman points out, that "worker's 
compensation benefits could be nearly doubled at no new cost 





Although the voluntary programs eventually had a major 
impact on occupational health when they were adopted as 
standards in 1971, worker's compensation was far and away 
the most important single factor in the area prior to OSHA. 
From the beginnings of the industrial revolution in the 
1870's up until the 1900's, employers had successfully 
avoided liability for worker injury and illness in the US. 
Under common law, employers were held to the "prudent 
person" standard, and expected to take due consideration of 
employee safety, including forewarning them of unusual 
hazards. In spite of this "counsel of perfection", workers 
were rarely able to recover against their employer in 
court. Proof of negligence on the part of the employer is 
difficult under the best of circumstances today, and even 
more difficult at the time as a result of the total 
dominance of employers in the legal arena. In addition to 
the expense, delay and uncertainty of a suit, litigants had 
to contend with a number of realities of the day. Coworkers 
or a foreman who might be key witnesses would risk firing if 
they testified on the workers behalf, and even with adequate 
testimony, the likelihood of a decision in the plaintiffs 
favor was small given three "doctrines" accepted as adequate 
defenses, sarcastically referred to as "The Holy Trinity".18 
The first, contributory negligence, absolved employers if 
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the employee could be shown to have contributed to the 
incident, even in a minor way. Likewise, employees could 
not collect if a coworkers;s negligence contributed, the 
fellow-servant doctrine. Finally, knowledgeable assumption 
of risk asserted that if a hazard causing injury was 
inherent to the work, and if the worker could be expected to 
have known of it, then his or her acceptance of the job 
precluded negligence. These three doctrines were inter¬ 
preted so liberally by the courts prior to 1900 that 
results favorable to the plaintiff were very unusual.19 By 
1900, however, workers began winning suits in greater 
numbers.20 Progressives began publicizing the plight of 
injured workers and their families, or in some cases, their 
survivors. The best known of these was the "Pittsburgh 
Survey", carried out by Crystal Eastman in 1907-8 which 
found that employers took no financial responsibility in 
over half the cases.21 Most important of all, big business 
cried for relief. In 1910 two large business associations, 
the National Civic Federation and the National Association 
of Manufacturers, started to lobby for state worker's 
compensation regulations. The reasons were simple. 
Although large corporations could underwrite their own 
insurance funds, medium and small firms could not, and for 
them some pooled risk scheme was needed. In addition, 
businessmen recognized the desirability of a system of 
preestablished and fixed payments, upon which they might 
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exercise some indirect control, over one in which workers 
were obtaining increasingly large jury awards that could 
spell catastrophe for many companies. Just how this 
indirect control was achieved is explored in the next 
section. Another motivation of commercial support was the 
fear that public perception of an injustice had reached 
proportions that might spur government to alter employer- 
employee relations (by invalidating the common law defenses, 
as occurred in a few states) and give the nascent union 
movement an unwanted boost. 
Not surprisingly, unions opposed worker's compensation 
legislation for reasons that we might expect: their mistrust 
of government interference and their expectation of improved 
results in the courts. It is also no shock that their 
opposition had little impact on the course of public policy. 
The theory behind the legislation was no-fault 
liability, providing prompt and adequate benefits while 
relieving both employers and employees of the uncertainty 
and expense of litigation. In actuality benefits were low, 
most states set maximum awards at 50% of the workers income 
and although an improvement over some court awards, the 
number of high value settlements was growing in the years 
preceding the legislation.22 With the acceptance of a comp 
award the worker forfeited the right to a common-law suit. 
The first states to pass compensation legislation. New 
York, Maryland, and Montana, had their statutes ruled 
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unconstitutional by the courts. Wisconsin, in 1911, became 
the first state to have a system which remained in effect, 
followed shortly by others including Connecticut in 1914. 
Twenty-four states had legislation by 1925, but it was not 
until 1948 that all states had such laws.23 The early laws 
excluded coverage of occupational disease, some more 
explicitly than others. Three reasons for this have been 
cited. First, as compensation laws were intended to 
supplant common law jurisdiction, and since disease claims 
were denied by common law, no need was seen to include it. 
Second, it was thought, perhaps correctly, that disease 
compensation would be much more expensive and place a heavy 
burden on industries, such as mining, where high disease 
rates were recognized by management, even if they denied 
responsibility. It was thought that illness could be 
handled by health and disability insurance, which dis¬ 
tributed the risk burden over a larger pool (and except for 
a few diseases such as asbestosis and lead toxicity, this 
remains to some extent today). Finally, in the more 
progressive states, the laws were written with language 
sufficiently expansive to allow future coverage of illness, 
but not so broad as to alarm legislators. Massachusetts 
was the first state to extend coverage in this way, followed 
by nine others in 1928 including Connecticut, 18 more in the 
1940's and the remainder between 1951 and the present. 24 
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To say that all states now have compensation for 
occupational disease is misleading. The compensation system 
was designed to provide prompt and fair payment to victims 
of workplace accidents, and despite some significant 
problems with award levels and incomplete coverage of all 
employees, the system has had some success. Ashford points 
out though that "the designers of the original statutes did 
not foresee the slow, silent disability caused by many of 
today's occupational hazards, and the problems of recogniz¬ 
ing and understanding such occupational diseases have 
therefore raised critical issues for the entire workmen's 
(sic) compensation system."25 We will return to this point 
shortly. 
The compensation system is heavily flawed. Some are 
functional obstacles, such as "inefficiency" of private 
insurers, discussed in the previous section, uneven coverage 
of workers in general, and unequal compensation of specific 
diseases or injuries from state to state. More serious are 
the flaws stemming from internal contradictions, which in 
turn reflect competing goals of the compensation system. 
These flaws bear more careful attention. 
Ashford identifies five "social" goals for the 
compensation system and what it should ideally accomplish: 
income maintenance, insurance, efficiency, broad uniform 
coverage, and equity. It is clear that the maintenance goal 
is not being met. According to data amassed by Berman in 
. 
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1978 from public and private sources those receiving 
compensation recover only one fifth of their original income 
on average. Four-fifths entering the system receive only 
medical benefits, in part because most states require 
disability for eight days or more to qualify for income 
replacement. If all of the workers entering the compensa¬ 
tion system in 1972 received all their lost salary, the 
amount paid out would have totalled $18.2 billion versus the 
$4 billion that was actually disbursed.26 Why not full 
income replacement? Are not the worker and their family 
entitled to live as though the worker "had remained well and 
sound?"27 A proposal has already been mentioned which would 
allow a doubling of benefits at no added expense. But this 
might compete with the goal of industrial efficiency, as 
construed by industry as output per dollar expended. It has 
long been feared that "as the proportion of wages replaced 
is increased, the worker will have less incentive to return 
to work."28 This would contribute to lost productivity and 
increased costs. As Ashford points out, the conflict 
between efficiency and income maintenance is a real one, but 
one which could be subject to empirical resolution through a 
study of return to work in relation to comp payments. This 
has yet to be done. The real lesson here (as with the 
additional conflicts enumerated elsewhere) is that internal 
inconsistency in the goals of programs, such as worker's 
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comp, lead to political struggles in which "the relative 
power of private interests may determine the outcome."29 
Perhaps the core inconsistency lies in the goal of 
insurance coverage. As already described, the initial 
intent was to insure workers against a decline in income 
secondary to injury and to protect industry from crippling 
liability judgments. But the type of insurance that was 
created is far better suited to the latter as it "treats the 
wastage of man-power as it does the wearing out of machi¬ 
nery."30 It is logical of this compensation system then to 
allow industry to pass on the costs of compensation to the 
consumer much as they would depreciate their equipment. 
Schneider stated in 1922 that: 
The plain purpose of the compensation law is to 
make the risk of accident one of the industry 
itself, to follow from the fact of injury, and 
hence that compensation on account thereof should 
be treated as an element in the cost of produc¬ 
tion, added to the cost of the article and borne 
by the community in general.31 
This fact, combined with a number of realities which 
insulate employers from the true costs of injury and 
illness, make compensation much less effective than it might 
be at promoting prevention. This is taken up again in 
Chapter six. 
Returning to worker's compensation and occupational 
disease, it is important to recognize how uncomfortably the 
comp system has accommodated the inclusion of disease. In 
contrast to accidents, which are discrete temporal events 
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with clear and often dramatic causal connection to any 
injury, disease is often slow to develop, difficult to 
distinguish from nonoccupational illnesses and the conse¬ 
quence of multiple causal factors. A classic illustration 
is lung cancer, which can develop 25 to 35 years after even 
brief exposure and which presents essentially in the same 
manner as Tobacco induced lung cancers. Furthermore, it is 
known that cigarette smoking increases the risk of lung 
cancer and other lung diseases in exposed workers. The 
Uretek hepatitis cases are also illustrative although 
unusual in their short latency period. Workers frequently 
run up against statutes of limitations for filing compensa¬ 
tion claims. The U.S. Department of Labor recommends a one 
year limit after the victim becomes aware of an illness and 
that the illness is work-related. In 1972 only 26 of 58 
worker's compensation statutes met this standard.32 The 
problem is further compounded if the worker has moved on to 
one or more employers or retired in the intervening years. 
This is the rule rather than the exception with occupational 
lung disease and cancer. Retired workers are particularly 
vulnerable, as the comp system requires the claimant to be 
in the workforce to be eligible for payments. 
Multiple and uncertain etiologies also present problems 
for a system which treats disease as a special sort of 
injury. For one, it has left the insurance carrier with an 
easily abused basis for contesting claims as it is quite 
. 
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difficult to achieve the same level of certainty in 
assigning cause in the case of disease as opposed to injury. 
This situation exists because the comp law takes an overly 
simplistic view of causation, treating it as a question 
amenable to swift resolution by one or more "experts". 
While this might be true of injuries that result from 
accidents, it is decidedly unproductive in the case of 
disease. The philosophical roots of this approach to 
problems are explored further in the section on obstacles to 
reform, in chapter six. For the moment, the point is that 
multiple causation introduces an element of irreducible 
uncertainty, beyond what is encountered in a workplace 
accident. This makes for long and acrimonious compensation 
hearings (eg the Uretek hearings still in progress a full 
year after the outbreak), or worse, workers being denied 
compensation. 
Although the response to workplace disease is not the 
central issue of this thesis, it is important to understand 
the very complex system that is worker's compensation. In 
fact, it is impossible to analyze prevention and recognition 
without such an understanding. By looking at the develop¬ 
ment of worker's comp legislation historically certain 
patterns become clear. In many states Government has 
abdicated its role, and in so doing, placed a heavy burden 
for injury and illness on workers and their families. A 
nation-wide study of 2.2 million workers disabled for at 
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least three months found only 24.7% ever receive compensa¬ 
tion. 68.5% never even bothered to apply and this appears 
to be because they did not expect to get anything. Less 
than 1% of all compensation payments before OSHA were for 
occupational disease, and four years after the OSH act, the 
number was 1.35%.33 All of this suggests a huge reservoir 
of uncompensated victims. Why is this so? The reasons are 
similar to those for the delay in recognition of the Uretek 
cases. Workers who got sick were fired and not eligible for 
compensation. Moreover, the cause and effect relationship 
of work and illness are clear neither to the employee nor 
the physician. As with Uretek, it can be a long time, and 
many sick workers, before this concordance is established. 
Particularly worrisome in this regard is the vast and 
rapidly increasing stock of chemicals to which workers are 
exposed, many incompletely tested for toxicity, and the time 
lag for appearance of information about their hazards. 
Perhaps the clearest, and unfortunately the most 
familiar pattern, is the ability of large companies to set 
societal priorities when legislation fails to resolve 
conflicting interests of workers and business. The next 
section will examine the development of occupational 




State Health & Safety Programs 
For a number of reasons, most of the early activities in 
occupational health occurred at the state level. For one, 
the response to workplace tragedies was most intense on a 
local level. The most famous of these disasters was the 
Triangle shirt-waist factory fire of 1911 in which 146 women 
died in a Greenwich Village factory. Many burned to death, 
unable to escape through blocked exits, others jumped eight 
stories to their death rather than be incinerated. It is 
worth noting that some recognition had been brought to 
working conditions in the garment industry just the year 
before the fire by a massive strike. Labor activism of this 
type was another source of pressure on the local level, but 
not nationally, as the unions were insufficiently powerful 
to generate federal activity in the 1920's. Even local 
influence was restricted to areas like New York with its 
relatively strong unions. In the case of the garment 
strike, the result was a city sanitary authority, which in 
any event did not avert the Triangle disaster. In a pattern 
which repeats itself throughout the history of workplace 
disasters, a committee was formed after the Triangle fire 
"to meet the public protest", in the words of New York State 
Senator Alfred Smith.34 
In reviewing the historical record for significant 
disasters and outbreaks, two important facts emerge. First, 
far fewer accidents have become part of the historical 
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record than one might expect given the documented conditions 
in factories of the day. In the case of the Triangle fire, 
a UPI reporter happened to be strolling through Washington 
Square as the flames ignited and proceeded to phone live 
reports to the telegraph office as the tragedy unfolded. 
Few accidents benefit from such exposure, especially 
smaller, less dramatic ones that occur far from Midtown 
Manhattan. Furthermore, diseases lack entirely this sort 
of immediacy, upon which the media thrives. A case in point 
is the Gauley Bridge, West Virginia outbreak of the early 
1930's, in which more than 700 tunnel miners died of acute 
silicosis, dwarfing the better known mining and factory 
accidents of the era and yet almost completely unknown 
today, even among labor historians. There are a number of 
reasons why Gauley Bridge may have fallen into obscurity, 
including a concerted effort to destroy records by the 
company, Union Carbide. It does at least raise the 
question, however, of how the media and scholars react to an 
epidemic of workplace disease as opposed to an accident. 
Certainly, an outbreak of a newly recognized disease, as was 
the case at Gauley Bridge and at Uretek, offers greater 
"plausible deniability" for an employer than a fire or 
accident. In the Gauley Bridge case the employer. Union 
Carbide, virtually escaped both public censure and sig¬ 
nificant financial responsibility.35 The Triangle fire is 
unusual in that it did have an indirect effect on other 
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states, perhaps because the drama and immediacy captured the 
media's attention. 
The Connecticut Experience 
Within two years of the Triangle fire three states. New 
York, Connecticut and Ohio, organized programs in factory 
inspection. Massachusetts had an early lead in this area 
with "power of closure" authority for grave hazards accorded 
to factory inspectors in 1852.36 By 1890, 14 states had 
statutes providing authority for factory and workshop 
inspectors. In most cases, however, these laws were window 
dressing as inspectors were political appointees and 
unlikely to ruffle business feathers. Few were trained to 
recognize safety hazards, and expertise in disease preven¬ 
tion was almost non-existent. 
The history in Connecticut was typical. Factory 
inspectors were appointed by the Governor, with consent of 
the Senate. Their responsibilities were as follows: 
He shall examine all buildings where machinery is 
used and report to the Governor as respects safety 
to life and health of such places. Shall see that 
factories are properly lighted, ventilated and 
clean. Shall have the power to require provisions 
(sic) of toilet rooms with the state Board of 
Health. Shall cause excessive dust to be removed. 
Shall inspect houses where certain forms of work 
are conducted and shall order them to be kept 




The authority to require restrooms is a bit more cir¬ 
cumscribed than the power of closure enjoyed by Massachu¬ 
setts inspectors. Moreover, responsibility for factory 
conditions was divided among factory inspectors, local and 
county health officers, the tuberculosis commission and the 
bureau of labor statistics.38 Though data on disease and 
accident rates in Connecticut at the time is not available, 
a newspaper story stated that accidental deaths dropped by 
4000 per year from 1915 to 1922 suggesting a far from 
trivial rate of mortality and presumably morbidity.39 This 
situation obtained until 1922 and the arrival of a new 
commissioner of Health from Massachusetts, Dr Stanley H. 
Osborn. Dr Osborn, a graduate of Tufts Medical School in 
1914, had served for three years as state epidemiologist 
before his appointment as Deputy Commissioner of Health in 
1920. Promoted to commissioner in 1922, he lost little time 
in expanding the role of the department of health in 
industrial hygiene. Up to that point the department's role 
in workplace protection was primarily imaginary. Organized 
in 1878, the state board could make investigations and issue 
reports on almost any subject affecting public health and 
safety but had no authority to remedy any condition 
discovered by its investigations.40 Recognizing that 
incidence data was required to direct investigations, Osborn 
had the reporting statute of 1921 revised to allow reports 




instead of to the commissioner of factory inspection.41 The 
statute already required any physician or patient who 
believed they were treating or suffering from a disease 
"contracted as a result of the nature of... employment" to 
contact the department of health within 48 hours. Just how 
often the law was observed, and by whom is not known though 
it did provide both for a fee to Physicians (50 cents) and a 
fine (10 dollars) for failure to report. Writing in 1928, 
the physician who ultimately took responsibility for 
occupational health in Connecticut commented: 
No appropriation was provided at that time, 
however, with which to secure the observation of 
this statute, so that like another I need not 
mention, it was honored more by its breach than by 
its observance and occupational disease reports 
were fragmentary to say the least.42 
Irrespective of the actual number, the reports made pursuant 
to this law served Dr. Osborn when he returned to the 
legislature in 1927 to request a full-time physician for the 
study of occupational disease. Osborn was successful in 
persuading the legislature to appropriate funds to "inves¬ 
tigate and make recommendations for the elimination or 
prevention of occupational diseases". The debate which 
occurred about the bill is interesting if only for its 
similarity to some of the statements made during the Uretek 
incident. 
In the discussion, a legislator asserted that "98% of 
the accidents are due to the carelessness of the operator." 




of injury: "Anthra (sic) is not due to the carelessness of 
men."43 Osborn goes on to say, "we are not asking money to 
treat disease. What we are asking is money for the 
prevention of disease." A month later, having persuaded the 
Health and Safety Committee, Dr. Osborn encountered stiffer 
resistance amongst Appropriations committee members. 
Republican Senator Edward F. Hall maintained that all 
occupational health problems were those of "proper machi¬ 
nery., and the personal habits and home conditions of the 
worker."44 Consistent with this view, Senator Hall opposed 
the appropriation on the grounds that "the employees should 
solve [it] themselves."45 The views of the Senator are not 
surprising given that many were factory owners, nor were 
they particularly original. What is notable about the 
session is the articulate and impassioned defense of the 
proposal by two representatives of the Connecticut Manufac¬ 
turers' Association. Making a point which is still to be 
fully appreciated, a Mr Walsh stated that: 
all disease is an economic loss to the people 
concerned and to the state. The state through its 
sanatoria is today taking care of a good many 
cases probably of occupational diseases. It is 
possible by making a careful study of disease to 
very much limit it. As you all know that is the 
way we have eliminated diseases.46 
His colleague Mr Smith added that "if $17,500 did nothing 
but solve that one condition in Danbury, I think it would 
more than pay for itself." Given the experience of the Yale 
clinic, and statements in the press by industry, these would 
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be enlightened views on their part even by contemporary 
standards. They are certainly atypical for the time and 
raise the issue of whether they owe more to personal 
allegiance to Dr Osborn than to forward thinking. There is 
unfortunately no record of how the manufacturers' associa¬ 
tion arrived at its position. In the annual report of the 
association for 1927 there is a suggestion that concerns 
about limiting compensation claims played a part. 
While the health department is not concerned in 
the worker's compensation aspect of this question, 
one effect of the work contemplated by the 
department will doubtless be a diminution of 
occupational disease claims47 
If indeed this was the principal reason for their support it 
is a curious one. It was perhaps not evident in those early 
years of worker's compensation that insurance premiums would 
not closely follow the history of claims at a particular 
plant. Although other influences may have played a role in 
this case, it may represent anecdotal evidence that premiums 
truly tied to costs might induce employers to take an 
interest in preventive measures. Just such a proposal is 
included in the final chapter. At any rate, the proposal 
passed over the objections of several legislators, and the 
sum of $17,500 dollars was appropriated. 
Dr Osborn used the funds to hire Dr Alfred S. Gray as 
director of the newly created division of occupational 
diseases. It was the first state to create an agency 
charged solely with the elucidation of workplace disease and 
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it went far beyond the "safety first" atmosphere of the day. 
It was, however, consistent with the philosophy of employer 
beneficence prevalent at the time. The approach of the 
department was that of cooperation with industry, with the 
assumption that once brought to its attention, industries 
would correct hazards as a matter of "good business". They 
had the power to inspect and recommend but there were no 
provisions for enforcement. 
The department is empowered to make investigations 
of any condition reported to it or suspected of 
causing occupational disease, and the result of 
its investigation cannot be used in court 
compensation cases.48 
There is evidence that in cases of imminent threat to life 
the health department could shut down a workplace, but this 
occurred rarely if ever.49 
The work of the department rapidly expanded, and there 
is evidence that it was effective even without punitive 
powers. In 1928 an engineer trained in industrial hygiene 
and laboratory technique was added and a laboratory was 
opened. The first year there were a "dozen or two" 
inquiries. By 1935 the number had grown to 463 requests for 
information, thirty-two technical studies and 148 site 
visits. According to a report by Dr Gray, the work of the 
department "resulted in definite improvement in working 
conditions, changes in processes, substitution of materials, 
and, in a number of instances, the purchase of entirely new 
.. 
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equipment, not as the result of mandatory orders but because 
of the fact that these industries were given definite 
concrete information on the effects of the environment on 
health."50 Major studies included mercurialism in the hat 
industry and lead toxicity. The hat industry study led in 
1941 to a ban on the use of Mercury to "cure" fur felt, 
particularly important as 50% of the hat industry was based 
in Connecticut. Many other states followed Connecticut's 
lead with a mercury ban of their own. 
As it did throughout the U.S., the Second World War 
expanded interest and all important funding to occupational 
health in order to achieve peak production efficiency. The 
bureau of industrial hygiene, as it was then called, 
expanded to 28 employees including physicians, nurses, 
chemists, and industrial hygienists/engineers.51 This may 
have been the largest industrial disease operation in the 
country. Prior to the war, Connecticut already had the 
largest staff and budget per number of industrial workers of 
any state.52 It was undoubtedly this unparalleled level of 
funding which allowed the bureau to pursue vigorous 
workplace surveillance. A 1940 annual report tallies 25 
studies of potential hazards, 367 site visits, investigation 
of 455 cases of disease and the receipt of 1066 requests for 
information. 
There were several unique aspects to the work of the 
bureau at that time, in addition to its size and high level 
' 
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of activity. Most significant was the presence of physi¬ 
cians who carried out real and informed evaluations of 
workplace health. In the words of Dr Osborn, the duty of 
the physician was "to appraise the health of the workers in 
terms of exposure to toxic substances... and to assist in the 
early recognition and the prevention of occupational 
disease.53 It is precisely this type of surveillance that 
is entirely lacking in the current system and is one of the 
prime weaknesses which allowed the Uretek outbreak to occur. 
The other significant activity of the bureau in the 
postwar period was the regular inspection of Connecticut 
workplaces. Unlike the current system whereby OSHA only 
inspects by management or labor request, a team including a 
physician might inspect on the basis of reports of occupa¬ 
tional disease gleaned from compensation records, company 
health department files, and state department of labor 
inspections. In addition, 
routine industrial hygiene surveys [were] 
conducted periodically by chemists or engi¬ 
neers... The interval between surveys determined by 
the hazards associated with the manufacturing 
processes. New plants, or changes in techniques 
and processes of old plants, require[d] immediate 
investigation.54 
This almost certainly suggests a level of surveillance of 
industry in the state which has not been matched to date. 
Dr Wistar Meigs, former director of the Yale Institute of 
Occupational Medicine (1947-70)55, recalls that the state 
bureau was managing to visit registered workplaces at least 
. 
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every two years. Dr Osborn did not note whether these 
visits were surprise or announced, nor for how long they 
persisted. He did record a large variety of investigations 
including airborne and biological monitoring (urine) for 
lead in brass, battery, and metallurgical industries, 
chlorinated hydrocarbons in degreasing and solvent reclama¬ 
tion operations, toluol in rubber manufacture and spray 
painting. A study of Para-Nitro-Phenol measurement in 
urine and blood cholinesterase activity in workers exposed 
to parathion, an insecticide, is sufficiently sophisticated 
to have been taken from the pages of a 1980's journal. What 
perhaps had begun as a naive but well-meaning agency had 
become a very sophisticated occupational health program. 
Boundaries were drawn quite broadly on the bureau's 
scope. Dr Osborn wrote of the "necessity of considering 
mental health as part of an occupational disease program" 
and cites poor housing and recreation facilities, repeti¬ 
tious and routine work, and dependence on others for 
economic security as reasons for this need. He placed a 
priority on abatement of noise and heat and hired an 
audiometrician for screening purposes. He promoted the 
distribution of educational material on family and community 
health including brochures on cancer, nutrition, women in 
industry, child care, venereal disease, tuberculosis, and 
mental hygiene. A clinic was established to evaluate 
workers with abnormal heart rhythms and the department 
. 
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contemplated providing a dentist to visit plants. Dr Osborn 
persuaded eight small Hartford factories to pool resources 
and hire a full-time experienced industrial physician. 
According to Dr Osborn, the plan in its sixth year of 
operation in 1952 "has worked out to the satisfaction of 
labor and management and has paid for itself in savings."56 
To this roseate view of the department, and acknowledging 
the radical nature of the approach just detailed, it is 
crucial to add that no objective data exists as to how well 
the bureau detected workplace hazards and whether they were 
appropriately abated. A UAW official complained at 1973 
hearings that no fines or legal action were ever insti¬ 
tuted.57 However, at least within the industrial hygiene 
field, the state's program was well-respected. Dr Osborn 
chaired the industrial hygiene committee of the Conference 
of State Health Authorities of 1928 to at least 1940, and 
the state's chief industrial hygienist chaired the American 
Conference of Hygienists for a number of years. 
The decline of the program in the 1950's suggests that 
not everyone appreciated their efforts. As is sometimes the 
case, the decline is less well documented than the ascendan¬ 
cy. Dr Meigs recalls that Dr Gray retired in the 1950's and 
that Ken Marckasson, an industrial engineer who replaced 
him, was much less persuasive with the legislature, perhaps 
because he was not an MD. Dr Osborn retired as Commissioner 
of Health in 1959 after 37 years, earning him the title of 
. 
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"dean" of health commissioners.58 Almost certainly the 
growth of the state department of industrial hygiene was due 
to the duration and intensity of commitment and the respect 
he commanded among legislators. 
Even before Osborn's retirement, the department had 
begun to shrink slowly from attrition, a trend justified by 
legislators on grounds that they had done such a thorough 
job, occupational disease was rapidly waning. According to 
John Geil, appointed chief industrial hygienist in 1967, the 
department had dwindled at that point to five industrial 
hygienists and a ventilation engineer under the direction of 
Joseph Staper, a physician. 
The history of occupational health in Connecticut is of 
a cyclic waxing and waning of attention and effort, while 
almost every other area of equivalent importance in medicine 
experienced exponential growth. The first surge of activity 
in the 1920's is followed by a levelling off in the 1930's, 
and then an explosion of activity during and immediately 
after World War II, again followed by a diminution of effort 
in the late 1950's and 1960's, this time more pronounced 
than in the 30's. Certainly the end of the New Deal and the 
crest of anti-labor sentiment accompanying McCarthyism 
played a role in the late 50's in decreasing the popularity 
of occupational health. Curiously, the prosperity and 
social unrest in the 1960's did not translate into improved 
worker health, at least not quickly, perhaps because of a 
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dilution of energy that accompanied the push for other 
health legislation such as Medicare and Medicaid. While the 
passage of the OSHA act in 1970 clearly presaged vast 
improvement in occupational health in most states, it can be 
seen as another phase in the cycle of oscillations, and, at 
least in Connecticut, not necessarily the peak of an upward 
spiral of progress when compared with the postwar bureau. 
OSHA & the State: By Whom? For Whom? 
The changes in state occupational health accompanying 
OSHA are confusing but not terribly important in the end. 
The decline of the bureau of industrial hygiene had occurred 
years before and although with a staff of six it may have 
been more effective than OSHA is today, it was hardly the 
groundbreaking effort it had been at its peak. After a 
brief experiment with a true focus on occupational health 
and prevention, the pendulum had again returned to the 
safety quarter. 
After years of floundering under the fragmentary 
authority of the Walsh-Healey Act which established 
standards for and authorized inspection of government 
contractors, the Federal Government finally promulgated 
national legislation in 1970. The process had begun 
officially in 1966 at the behest of President Johnson. The 
precise historical factors which motivated the president 
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have not been extensively studied to date, and such an 
undertaking is beyond the scope of this paper. Certainly, 
the environmental movement's politicization of the effects 
of pollution and the concerns it raised about chemicals did 
much to break the trail and focus concern on the workplace. 
In any event, the departments of Labor and HEW both began 
development of a federal program and quickly became 
ensnarled in a 2-year bureaucratic tug-of-war over who would 
ultimately be in control of the new agency. Bold maneuver¬ 
ing by the Secretary of Labor persuaded the Bureau of Budget 
and the president to accept the labor proposal and Johnson 
called on Congress to pass enabling legislation in 1968. 
The legislation stalled, due in part to vigorous opposition 
by business in the form of the Chamber of Commerce. As we 
have seen before OSHA, a disaster and the outrage which 
ensues is often required to overcome opposition to occupa¬ 
tional health legislation. In 1968, 76 workers died in an 
explosion at the Farmington Mine in West Virginia. Congress 
responded in 1969 with the Mine Safety Act, and in 1970, 
answering the hue and cry of both public and labor, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act. A further analysis of 
OSHA beyond that here and in Chapters 2 & 3 is, unfortunate¬ 
ly, not within the limits of this project.59 
For the sake of completeness, the events in the state 
in the early 1970's as a consequence of the OSH Act will be 
briefly discussed. The federal OSHA legislation passed in 
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1970 encouraged states to develop their own programs, 
provided they were at least as stringent as the federal act, 
and, as an inducement, offered to provide 50% of the annual 
costs. At that time responsibility was divided in Connec¬ 
ticut, with the Health Department responsible for workplace 
health, and the Department of Labor, and its inspectors, 
looking after safety. From 1971 to 1973, Federal OSHA 
existed side by side with the aforementioned state struc¬ 
tures and developed a reputation for action, at least 
comparatively. Connecticut was one of the first states to 
file with the federal government for approval of a state 
plan and in February 1973, public hearings were held for 
comment on the proposal. The plan had been developed by 
the Department of Labor without input from the Department of 
Health or Dr Staper. By and large the opposing testimony 
was very well thought out and researched. The opposition 
included organized labor, citizens' groups, and students and 
faculty of Yale law and medical schools. Many of the most 
incisive critiques cut to the flaws of federal OSHA as most 
of the state plan was lifted verbatim from the federal 
statute. However, the principal concern of many opponents 
was that state supervision, especially by the Department of 
Health, would be inadequate. Mr Michael Kane, representing 
the now defunct New Haven Citizens' Action Committee, 
stated: 
The testimony and experience of the Unions that we 
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have been in touch with have shown the inadequacy 
of state enforcement, particularly by the 
Department of Health. As an example, in 18 years 
the Connecticut Health Department...has referred 
exactly one case...to the state Attorney General's 
office for possible prosecution...In contrast, the 
Federal OSHA office for this region, although it 
is understaffed, has compiled a relatively 
impressive record of protection of worker health 
within the limits of federal law.60 
Kane also pointed out that in 1968 Connecticut fielded 37 
fish-and-game wardens (in a state not renowned for its 
hunting and fishing), and the same number of state workplace 
inspectors. Kane's views were echoed by representatives of 
Labor at the meeting. With two OSHA inspectors covering the 
state in 1988, a return to even the 1968 level, viewed by 
Kane as woefully inadequate, would be welcome. Kane went 
on to say that much of the mistrust of the state centered on 
a feeling that they would back away from large employers who 
were fighting OSHA in court at the time (e.g. United 
Technologies). The decline of OSHA under President Reagan 
could not, of course, be foreseen in 1973, but it is ironic 
that in the wake of Uretek, Connecticut unions have called 
for a return to state authority. 
Another set of concerns about the state plan, especial¬ 
ly relevant to the Uretek case, was raised by the Yale Lung 
Research Center. Speaking for the group, Janet Schoenberg, 
a public health student, described three major areas of 
concern about the state plan that apply equally to federal 
OSHA. Noting that much emphasis had been placed on safety 




"magnitude of industrial health problems is grossly 
underestimated".61 The group recommended that safety 
inspectors be trained in rudimentary hygiene technique so 
that they might notice health hazards. Certainly this would 
be a welcome addition to federal OSHA, as well as possibly 
averting the necessity of separate health and safety 
investigations that led to the ignored safety report on 
Uretek in February 1979, and the needless continuation of 
the hazard for seven additional years. Schoenberg also took 
issue with the state's proposed five-year inspection 
interval, describing it as "totally inadequate" given the 
seriousness of certain health hazards and the frequency of 
changes in industrial processes.62 Again, it is difficult 
to find words to describe the degree to which workers are at 
risk in the current system, with inspections much less 
frequent than every five years on average. The final 
recommendation of interest was that medical surveillance be 
an explicit part of the act. As we have discussed, this is 
one of the major failings of the OSH Act as well and a 
recommendation which will be reiterated in Chapter six. The 
other testimony against the state plan had to do with 
promulgation of standards, composition of the review 
commission, and other points more germane to a discussion of 
the federal OSH Act. The testimony in support of the state 
plan came from the Manufacturers' Association, the Business 
and Industry Association, and small factory owners, all of 
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it resting on the basic premise that state and local 
supervision is better than federal oversight. One final 
point concerning the hearing worth noting is the prophetic 
testimony of Leonard Dube of the Connecticut UAW. Mr Dube 
made the following statement to the state panel: 
Between the citation appeal system, the pos¬ 
sibility of long abatement periods, and the 
variance system, the clever employer can keep a 
modern day sweat shop humming for literally years 
before he feels the minor pinch of an insig¬ 
nificant civil fine, or, at the worst, a suspended 
criminal sentence.6-* 
This is basically a description of the way Uretek conducted 
itself in regard to its DEP and its OSHA violations, and as 
some would say, with the predicted outcome. In spite of the 
many flaws identified in the state bill, the Labor committee 
reported it favorably to the General Assembly. 
The bill went rather rapidly to the House in April, and 
in May to the Senate, where it was passed. There was a 
considerable amount of acrimonious debate, some of it 
reflecting insufficient time to consider such a complex 
piece of legislation. Those in favor of the bill, primarily 
Republicans who held majorities in both chambers at the 
time, argued that it provided for two groups of employees 
not covered by the federal act - those of municipalities and 
the state, which was true. Another argument offered in 
favor was that the state plan would lighten the onerous 
burden of federal stipulations on Connecticut industry and 
avert imminent shutdowns and layoffs. The hyperbole 
' 
History 98 
involved in this position was evident to the opposition at 
the time, and certainly to any contemporary reader, but the 
Democrats did not succeed in defeating or amending the bill. 
A final point, and perhaps the most important, is that 
supporters estimated that the state would receive $350,000 
during the first year of implementation. So the act was 
seen as a way to obtain federal funding for a state agency 
with the sweetener that, if necessary, they could double the 
size of the department at no cost to the state (there were 
45 state inspectors at the time, including only 7 qualified 
to inspect for workplace health violations, and 8 OSHA staff 
members for the region). It was the prospect of a large 
grant from Washington toward a program for which Connecticut 
was already paying that ultimately swayed the legislators. 
In 1977, after four years of experience with the state- 
administered program, the General Assembly reversed itself 
and returned full authority to the federal government, 
except for state and municipal employees who are not covered 
by the OSHA legislation. Complaints with the state plan 
were of duplication, of poor quality of inspections, and, 
most of all, of unnecessary expenditure. Suddenly the 
state's 50% share, some $311,000, seemed too much to pay 
with a tightened fiscal climate, and opponents of the 
original bill were able to reverse the 1973 action. Not 
surprisingly, the state agency with its hobbled medical 
branch had dealt poorly with health hazards and had been 
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embarrassed by surprise OSHA visits to plants such as 
Groton's Electric Boat shipyard, which uncovered willful 
health violations. A federal review of state performance 
showed that 96.3 % of inspections were in the safety area 
and only 3.7% in the health area in one six month period. 
Even former supporters of the state plan recanted. As one 
legislator put it: 
Connecticut OSHA can respond well within a very 
limited area of capability, maybe retail stores, 
maybe beyond that, but in terms of the industrial 
sector, they have not been doing the job. And I 
say this as someone who voted for putting OSHA 
under Connecticut in 1973.64 
Though the better informed individuals were skeptical of 
federal OSHA's abilities as well, there was a climate of 
renewed optimism with President Carter's appointment of Eula 
Bingham as OSHA's head. As Uretek has so amply proven, the 
promise of decent workplace conditions made by the OSH Act 
is yet to be realized. The next chapter will look at 
obstacles to creating a healthy workplace highlighted by the 




1. There is, of course, an overlap of methodologies. 
Epidemiological methods are applied to injury and 
probability to disease. Disease is, however, more 
idiosyncratic and host-dependent. 
2. Cullen (1987), B5. 
3. There are notable exceptions. See, for example, 
Paracelcus (16th century Europe) on diseases of miners 
and metal workers; Agricola (16th century) also on 
mining and metallurgy; Bernardino Ramazzini (1633-1714) 
is acknowledged as the parent of modern occupational 
medicine. His treatise on hazards in the medieval 
crafts, De Morbis Artificum reads well even today. 
4. It would be satisfying at this point to quote some 
statistics to substantiate the rise in occupational 
disease. The temptation to do so has gotten the 
better of more than a few otherwise incisive critics 
of the current system (e.g. Berman (1978)). This 
point actually takes us right to the heart of one of 
the central issues in occupational health today, that 
of a data base. The view propounded in chapter six 
holds that the data base is currently so flawed as to 
be useless. So, although numbers to support the views 
in the text can be found, they come from the same 
flawed statistical base or unreferenced estimates as 
the numbers used to contradict them. Unfortunately, it 
is not possible at this time to make definitive 
statements about events as fundamental as the number of 
deaths on the job in America. For purposes of scale, 
the most reliable estimate cites 100,000 annual deaths 
due to occupational disease and 390,000 new cases of 
occupational illness per year (from the Office of 
Technology Report (1985)). By comparison, death from 
AIDS in the US last year totalled approximately 13,200, 
with 21,917 new cases identified amongst the 1-2 
million Americans exposed (from CDC AIDS survey report, 
January 25, 1988). Thus, nearly ten times as many 
people died on the job last year as died of AIDS. 
Keep in mind that while the AIDS data is highly 
reliable, the occupational figures may underestimate 
actual figures because of the lack of a reliable 
reporting system. The AIDS example, while not a true 
analogy for occupational disease, underscores the 
extent to which a problem as significant as occupa¬ 
tional disease is unrecognized. Reform of the data 
collection system is clearly a high priority. 
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CHAPTER SIX: PROGNOSES AND PRESCRIPTIONS 
The drama of the Uretek story has done much to 
publicize the plight of workers' health in the media. 
However, in its tendency to simplify, and its disregard for 
historical context, the reporters told only part of the 
story. Yes, OSHA had been ravaged by budget cuts and this 
in part accounted for the lugubriousness and seeming 
disinterest OSHA displayed in the Uretek case. But the 
media missed the fact that OSHA has little capacity to 
assess workplace health. Moreover, the fact that the state 
Health Department had very successfully incorporated just 
those functions in the 1930's and 40's went completely 
unrecognized. As Cullen has pointed out, "uretek was 
neither the first, nor the worst case, of life-threatening 
disease stemming from the workplace.1 Of the more than 
2,000 cases of Occupational disease seen by the Yale clinic 
since 1979, more than a few have been fatal and most did not 
occur in facilities described as "Dickensian". This final 
chapter is a synthesis of a deeper analysis of the Uretek 
outbreak. It provides some subtler reasons why Uretek was 
missed, what is needed to prevent future Ureteks, and some 




If that awareness [of Uretek] could be transformed 
into a deeper understanding of what transpired and 
why it will continue to happen until people demand 
a change, perhaps something worthwhile may yet be 
accomplished.2 
It is in this spirit that this chapter is proffered. 
Recognizing Workplace Disease: 
Why Uretek Was Missed 
Thus far the focus has been on the bureaucratic 
deficiencies of OSHA: lack of funding, lack of health 
enforcement, and scarcity of standards. OSHA's failings can 
not be blamed solely on a failure of political will, 
however. There are a number of characteristics of occupa¬ 
tional illness that make it so difficult to recognize and 
are in part responsible for OSHA'S inadequacy. 
Foremost are three aspects of occupational disease 
alluded to in earlier chapters. First, occupational 
disease is difficult to distinguish from nonoccupational 
disease. Rarely is there any sign, aside form the work 
history, which provides a clue to the etiology. The other 
two elements, multifactorial causation and long latency, 
were already mentioned in regard to the workers' compensa¬ 
tion system. These two together make it difficult to 
establish the cause of workplace illnesses. In the Uretek 
case, liver injury was a nonspecific response to chemicals; 
viruses and alcohol & drug abuse had to be excluded. In the 
case of asbestos related lung disease, on the other hand, 





asbestos fibers in the production of lung carcinomas and 
must be factored into attributions of causation. These 
examples are provided to show that it is often easy to 
dismiss a workplace disease as due to some agent outside the 
workplace, and this tendency affects physicians and workers 
alike. 
Another issue hindering the prompt recognition of 
workplace morbidity, especially notable at Uretek, is 
limited data on chemicals. There are between 250 and 
500,000 substances in use in US factories, and OSHA has 
exposure limits for about 500 of the total number. Part of 
the problem has been that the rapid proliferation of new 
substances has run far ahead of research on their toxic 
effects. In a few cases this already worrisome situation 
has been worsened by misrepresentation on the part of 
chemical manufacturers. The net result is that workers way 
be legally exposed to high levels of chemicals for which the 
health effects are not known. 
Disincentives to report also impede recognition of on- 
the-job illness. Workers may be ignorant of the hazards, 
like the Uretek workers,and thus be unable to diagnose their 
own malady. Even a worker who feels he is sick because of 
his job may be ignored by his employer, at best, or risk 
being fired, at worst, if he or she takes the concern to 
OSHA. Although the OSH act provides for the anonymity of 
those who make reports, the instigator may be obvious in a 
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small shop. Less obvious is that fact that some workers may 
hesitate to report because they fear elimination of their 
job, or that they might be transferred to one that pays 
less. ("Dirty jobs" often provide "hazard pay".) On the 
employer side, there is the somewhat misplaced fear that 
reporting of illness in their workplace may bring OSHA 
inspections, fines, and higher compensation insurance 
premiums. All of these factors tend to keep workplace 
disease a silent epidemic. 
One final point, though left to last, is not to be 
underemphasized. That is, the abysmal state of medical 
training in occupational medicine. Yale's curriculum 
includes just one hour in four years and the situation is 
similar, or worse at other institutions. Fewer than one 
third of all medical curricula include any required 
coursework3 and little postgraduate exposure occurs in 
internal medicine or family practice residency training.4 
The consequence of this is that few physicians collect an 
occupational history or know what patterns to look for. As 
Cullen has succinctly maintained: 
Inability to recognize symptoms and signs of 
illness as related to work exposures precludes 
useful clinical intervention: opportunity for 
disease modification and possible prevention of 
disease in others is simply lost.5 
It is to the topic of prevention that we now turn. 
’ 
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Preventing Workplace Disease: 
No More Ureteks 
The threat of an OSHA inspection has been useful in 
motivating changes suggested by the Yale clinic in some 
workplaces, and OSHA itself has prompted abatement of 
hazards in others. As we have seen, however, this is not 
by itself adeguate to protect worker health. The need for a 
separate surveillance system has been implied throughout the 
discussion of the Uretek case. 
The debate in Connecticut, and other states, over 
whether the state or the federal government should run such 
a system is really a mirage. The real issue is what sort of 
agency is needed. Cullen and others have proposed that a 
true federal occupational health agency be created and 
staffed by physicians, epidemiologists, and toxicologists: 
The bottom line is that a strong OSHA needs a 
strong, empowered companion, a health agency that 
evaluates , as OSHA evaluates machines and 
chemicals.D 
Such an agency will need appropriate legal authority to 
compel intransigent employers to cooperate. It will need 
funding adequate to provide for inspection and for encourag¬ 
ing the training of professionals and education of workers 
in occupational health and risks of the workplace. It will 
probably want to implement exposure limits which involve 
biological (eg blood, urine, chest x-ray, pulmonary function 
tests, etc) monitoring as opposed to only airborne monitor¬ 
ing as done by OSHA. Biological monitoring is currently 
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only in use for workers exposed to lead, asbestos, coal, and 
cotton dust. This type of oversight would allow for better 
estimation of actual exposure, especially by dermal 
absorption, and stricter enforcement of standards. Lead 
workers, for example, who are found to have blood levels 
above the legal limit on periodic checks, cannot work until 
the levels fall below the safety limit, and continue to 
receive full pay during any furlough. The incentive is 
clearly very strong in those workplaces to attend to worker 
health. The same effect could be reinforced if workers' 
compensation insurance rates began to reflect the actual 
costs and performance of a given workplace. We have 
reviewed the point that only a fifth of the income losses 
from injuries are recouped by workers, and then only by the 
minority who apply for compensation.7 Since disease 
represents only 1-2% of all compensation claims it makes 
sense to assume that very little of the actual costs are 
being reflected in premium rates. The bottom line is that 
an equitable system should account for who benefits and who 
bears risks, and to place the costs of disease on the 
former, not the latter.8 
Perhaps most important to the success of any agency 
charged with protection of worker health will be reliable 
information concerning the incidence of disease. It is a 
truism that what is not yet discovered can not be altered. 
In order for occupational health to receive funding 
* 
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commensurate with its importance, and to direct its focus 
once such monies are allocated, reliable statistics must be 
collected. The current state of affairs is so dire that 
there is disagreement about information as basic as the 
number of people who die at work in America. This is 
estimated to be 100,000 individuals but even this is a rough 
approximation. A recent study commissioned by the National 
Research Council excoriated the current system, especially 
the recent moves toward voluntary reporting, and made 
extensive recommendations for improvement.9 This data will 
not only direct enforcement activity but also badly needed 
clinical research on the health effects of workplace 
hazards. This would include the natural history of 
occupational diseases; the spectrum of signs, symptoms, and 
laboratory findings in a specific disorder; comparisons of 
alternative strategies for diagnosis and treatment; 
development of early predictors; and assessment of the 
psychological and social impact of interventions requiring 
changes in a person's work.10 
Larger Issues: 
The Ruling Paradigm 
This review of the Uretek outbreak has revealed a 
number of themes or paradigms which undergird thinking in 
our society and which will stand in the way of the sorts of 
improvements just suggested. 
. 
Prognoses 112 
The first is a "crisis orientation" not shared by other 
countries to the same degree. Progress in occupational 
health has either followed workplace disasters or been at 
the behest of business demands. There has been little in 
the way of preventive thinking. The same pattern can be 
seen in our parochial devotion to petroleum in a world soon 
to run out, to our production of nuclear and toxic waste 
with no safe place to put it, and in the health arena, to 
the sudden attention to "national" medical insurance when it 
has become too expensive for businesses to insure their 
employees. 
A corollary to the crisis orientation is methodological 
individualism; the reduction of societal and systemic 
problems to the individual level. In workplace safety, the 
focus is on the "accident-prone" worker. With unemployment, 
the problem is individuals too lazy to look at the want ads. 
With rape it is the provocatively dressed woman. With 
homelessness it is disdain for living indoors. With 
poverty, a lack of drive and initiative. Thus it is a 
logical extension to view Uretek as the result of alcohol 
and tylenol abuse. One of the things that allows this 
asystemic approach to exist is the ahistorical character of 
American news coverage, amply exemplified in the Uretek 
reporting. While it is true that "newness" is newsworthi¬ 
ness the world over, American news coverage, with its 
. 
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penchant for images and "bites", is particularly extreme in 
its slavishness to the "new". 
Another dominant paradigm in government has been the 
use of economic criteria in decisionmaking. The view of the 
current administration has been to regulate only in 
instances of "market failure", and then, only after a cost- 
benefit analysis. There are several problems with this 
model when applied to workplace health. "Market failure" is 
practically guaranteed by "inadequate information, lack of 
labor mobility, unequal bargaining power, and presence of 
externalized costs" (eg compensation).11 In addition, cost- 
benefit and effectiveness analyses raise serious ethical 
considerations. It is claimed that assigning costs to 
benefits and negative outcomes is a neutral aid to decision¬ 
making. While cost-benefit can be a useful tool, providing 
decision-makers with important information about the 
consequences of various courses of action, it becomes 
dangerous when it becomes the decision rule itself. This 
forces the monetization of all considerations, including 
ethical ones. MacLean and Sagoff, in a report commissioned 
for the excellent Office of Technology (OTA) report: 
"Preventing Illness and Injury in the Workplace", make the 
following point: 
How can cost-benefit analysis claim to be either 
neutral or comprehensive if it cannot deal with a 
wide range of moral, cultural, aesthetic, and 
political concerns? There may be some issues that 
raise few important cultural or moral issues? for 




determine the prices of hog bellies or potash. 
This does not show, however, that markets or 
market analysis can give us an adequate policy for 
public safety and health. On the contrary, where 
moral, political and cultural values-not simply 
economic ones-are at stake, we need to make moral, 
political, and aesthetic judgments. Cost-benefit 
analysis does not replace these "subjective" 
judgments with "objective" or "neutral" ones. 
Rather, it distorts or ignores the noneconomic 
values it cannot handle.*2 
Finally, it must be pointed out that where large 
differences in income, education, and access to political 
institutions exist, exploitation is more likely, and perhaps 
inevitable. This is perhaps the clearest predisposing 
factor...and also the most difficult to change, as it is 
sanctioned by beliefs at the core of American society. 
These concerns might be dismissed as academic were it 
not for the fact that there are almost certainly many more 
Ureteks. Most factory owners are not so deceitful, nor do 
they attract attention to themselves by polluting the 
environment. However, this does not prevent workers from 
getting sick, by accident or by negligence. Most diseases 
have longer latency periods than the liver injury from DMF, 
making it difficult for worker or physician to correlate 
illness and exposure. As we have seen, even with these 
"flags" in the Uretek case, the elucidation of the outbreak 
was no simple matter. The paradigms discussed in this 
chapter are under attack and though the assault is not new 
they will surely be slow to perish. In the meantime there 
will continue to be those who critique them and offer new 
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ones to take their place. We have to wonder if any will do 
so more eloquently than Rabbi Steven Wise, speaking at a 
memorial service for the Triangle fire victims in 1911. In 
light of Uretek, and many other workplace tragedies, his 
words are both prophetic and incisive: 
This was not an inevitable disaster which man 
could neither foresee nor control. We might have 
foreseen it, and some of us did; we might have 
controlled it, but we chose not to do so. The 
things that are inevitable we can do no more than 
vainly regret, but the things that are avoidable 
we can effectively forestall and prevent. 
It is not a question of enforcement of law 
nor of inadequacy of law. We have the wrong kind 
of laws and the wrong kind of enforcement. Before 
insisting upon inspection and enforcement, let us 
lift up the industrial standards so as to make 
conditions worth inspecting, and, if inspected, 
certain to afford security to the workers. 
Instead if unanimity in the shirking of respon¬ 
sibility, we demand that departments shall 
cooperate in planning ahead and working for the 
future, with some measure of prevision and wisdom. 
And when we go before the legislature of the 
state, and demand increased appropriations in 
order to ensure the possibility of a sufficient 
number of inspectors, we will not forever be put 
off with the answer: We have no money. 
The lesson of the hour is that while property 
is good, life is better, that while possessions 
are valuable, life is priceless. The meaning of 
the hour is that the life of the lowliest worker 
in the nation is sacred and inviolable, and, if 
that sacred human right be violated, we shall 
stand adjudged and condemned before the tribunal 
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